Paul Miller, Kathy Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, Kenneth Riddle : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Paul Miller, Kathy Miller v. USAA Casualty
Insurance Company, Kenneth Riddle : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stuart H. Schultz; Peter H. Barlow; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Appellees.
Lynn B. Larsen; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co, No. 20000268.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/450
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY 
MILLER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as 
USAA Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company), and 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Supreme Court No. 20000268-SC 
Priority no. 15 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal From the Fifth District Court, Iron County, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
349 South 200 East, Suite 670 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
(801)363-2893 
Fax (801) 363-2927 F I L E D 
AUG 2 <i 2000 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY 
MILLER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as 
USAA Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company), and 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal From the Fifth District Court, Iron County, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Stuart H. Schultz Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
Peter H. Barlow 349 South 200 East, Suite 670 
STRONG & HANNI Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
9 Exchange Place #600 Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-2893 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Fax (801) 363-2927 
Supreme Court No. 20000268-SC 
Priority no. 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES vi 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW. 1 
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 18 
ARGUMENT 19 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION. 19 
II. THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE A FORUM 
TO ADDRESS PLAINTIFFS'REMAINING CLAIM 28 
III. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT CONFIRMING THE APPRAISAI. 
AWARD 34 
IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES 35 
CONCLUSION 37 
ADDENDUM 39 
ii 
ADDENDUM: i 
1. Limited Appraisal Award, dated December 17, 1999, RI. 98 and RII. 
1104 
2. Complaint in case no. 970500080 ("Miller I") filed February 10, 1997, 
RI. 6 
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss including Supporting Memorandum in 
Miller I filed March 24, 1997, RI. 15 
4. Order of Dismissal in Miller I filed August 21,1997, RI. 41 
5. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement in Miller I filed December 3, 
1997, RI. 55 
6. Memorandum Opinion in Miller I filed February 17, 1998, RI. 89 
7. Complaint in case no. 980500127 ("Miller II") filed February 27, 
1998, RII. 12 
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Record in Miller II, case no. 980500127. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should the trial court have provided a forum for resolution of 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims? Are Plaintiffs ever entitled to a hearing 
of their breach of contract and extra contractual claims? 
2. Was it proper for the trial court to refuse to confirm the 
arbitration award and dismiss the action without directing re-
arbitration or providing another forum for resolution of 
Plaintiffs' claims? This was particularly troubling when the 
arbitrators, following the direction from the trial court, 
referred several claims back to the trial court for resolution. 
The panel stated: 
. . . the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to 
Court Order and . . . defers any and all claims, damages, 
and losses, including but not limited to any extra-
contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that 
the extra-contractual claims be determined through a 
1 
court trial process, rather than an appraisal process. 
(Add. 1; RI. 98 and RII. 1104)2 
Nevertheless, the court refused to set a trial, or provide any forum for 
resolution of the claims. The court just dismissed the action. 
These issues were preserved in Plaintiffs' Motion for Conference 
(Add. 14; RI. 101 and RII. 1107), Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm and to 
Schedule for Trial (Add. 15; RI. 104 and RII. 1197), among other pleadings. 
By order of March 10, 2000, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motions. (Add. 
16; RII. 1343) Plaintiffs appealed that denial on March 23, 2000. (Add. 17; 
RI. 108 and RII. 1346) 
Because the propriety of a dismissal is a question of law, it is reviewed for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court' s determinations. Hunsaker v. 
State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993). 
2 "Add." refers to the ADDENDUM. "RI" refers to the record in Miller I, case no. 
970500080. "RII" refers to the record in Miller II, case no. 980500127. 
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STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Sections 12 and 19 of the Utah Arbitration Act, U.C.A. §78-3 la (1985) 
U.C.A. §78-31a-12 
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice to all parties, the court shall 
confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate or modify the award. 
U.C.A. §78-3la-19 
An Appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law for 
appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE: Brief summary of the facts.3 
In June of 1996, the Millers' water heater burst causing water to flood their 
home and saturate the ceiling and walls of their mostly finished basement. They 
promptly reported the loss to their insurer, Defendant USAA. The USAA adjuster, 
Defendant Ken Riddle, visually inspected the home but refused to investigate inside 
the walls. He told the Millers that any damage within the walls was their problem. 
A dispute resulted over the amount of loss and extent of damage. Millers filed suit 
against USAA, seeking to recover for the property loss, breach of contract, 
emotional distress, bad faith, etc. 
The court determined that the dispute should be resolved by an appraisal 
ADR process. The parties could not agree on the scope of the appraisal, so the 
Millers asked the trial court for clarification. The court told the parties that a 
separate action would need to be filed to determine the scope of the appraisal. The 
Millers promptly filed a second action. The court, in the second action, interpreted 
the referral to appraisal in the first action to include " all losses claimed by the 
3 The NATURE OF THE CASE is presented without citation to the record. The 
citations are provided in the more detailed FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY that follows. 
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Plaintiffs" and that the " assessment of such loss shall include all damages 
suffered by Plaintiffs from the broken water heater in the most general sense. . ." 
The court further gave the panel the discretion to determine which claims 
would be appraised and which would not. The court stated: 
The Court's Order . . .extend[ed] to the appraisers and the 
umpire the discretion to determine which damages or claims 
would be appraised. 
The appraisal panel conferred and exercised the discretion given it by the 
court and chose " to only appraise property damages within the limits of the 
policy." The appraisal panel decided that a court trial, instead of an appraisal, was 
more appropriate to resolve the breach of contract and extra-contractual claims. The 
panel returned these claims to the court for resolution. The panel explained: 
. . . the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court 
Order and has chosen to only appraise property damage 
within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any 
and all claims, damages, and losses, including but not 
limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more 
appropriate that the extra-contractual claims be determined 
through a court trial process, rather than an appraisal 
process. Therefore, the panel did not address or decide issues 
or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance 
policy. 
The panel did make a monetary award on the " property damage within the 
limits of the policy" of $40,880, which USAA promptly paid. But, as slated above, 
the panel deferred to the trial court the resolution of the breach of contract and 
extra-contractual claims. 
The Millers returned to the court to confirm the appraisal award and to 
schedule a trial of the remaining claims. The court refused and dismissed the action. 
The court held 
The appraisers and umpire having performed their duties and exercised 
their discretion, and made an award for damages found to be a loss 
covered under the policy, this matter is now concluded and there are no 
pending claims to be further considered. 
This appeal followed. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. In January/February of 1997, the Millers filed the first action against 
USAA for breach of contract, torts, etc, case no. 970500080. ("Miller I") (Add. 2; 
RI- 6). The Millers sought recovery for 
a. Physical damage to the home 
b. Loss of use of the home 
c. Mental and emotional distress 
d. Physical illness and distress 
e. Frustration and embarrassment 
f. Infliction of emotional distress 
g. Bad Faith 
h. Punitive damages 
i. Other special, general and consequential damages 
all arising from the bursting of a water heater in the Miller home in June 1996. The 
USAA inactions lead to the growth of bacteria and mold in the home, to illness, to 
making the home uninhabitable, and to the loss of the home. (Add. 10, para. 9-13; 
RII. 235-234) 
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2. USAA moved to dismiss Miller I, alleging that the dispute should be 
resolved through the appraisal process (Add. 3; RI. 15). USAA' s motion made no 
distinction between the various claims of Plaintiffs. 
3. Without opposition from Plaintiffs, the Court granted the USAA 
motion and directed the parties to resolve their dispute through appraisal. (Add. 4; 
RI.41). 
4. Thereafter, counsel met to plan the appraisal USAA refused to agree 
to appraisal of anything other than the physical damage to the home, in contrast to 
the numerous claims asserted in Miller I. USAA refused even to agree to a 
reservation of those other claims while the property damage issue was resolved 
through appraisal. (See Add. 5; RI. 55-52) 
5. Therefore, Plaintiffs requested the court to reinstate the matter to the 
trial calendar. (Add. 5; RI. 55-52) 
6. On February 17, 1998, the court ruled that a separate suit should be 
filed to determine the meaning of the appraisal clause of the insurance agreement. 
The court stated: 
8 
The suit which plaintiffs seek to resurrect has no claim relating 
to the interpretation of the appraisal clause. If there is a viable 
claim of that type, it may be grounds for a separate suit , . . . 
(Add. 6; RI. 88-87, bold added) 
7. On February 27, 1998, Plaintiffs filed the second action, Case No. 
980500124, ("Miller IF) as suggested by the Court, to obtain a declaration that the 
appraisal was to be all inclusive. (Add. 7; RI. 12-3) The Complaint states in 
pertinent part: 
23. Plaintiffs request the Court . . . to determine how the 
appraisal clause should be interpreted and implemented without 
restricting or limiting the claim of Plaintiffs. 
24. Plaintiffs submit that if the appraisal clause is to be 
implemented, it must be done in a fair and equitable manner to 
allow all elements of Plaintiffs1 claims to be addressed. 
25. Defendant Insurance Company has refused to agree to 
any appraisal form which "would give any credence to the 
theories of recovery alleged by Plaintiffs". Defendant 
Insurance Company is further unwilling to "agree to the form 
even if the statement were added that Defendant Insurance 
Company was not in any way acknowledging or agreeing to the 
viability of the theories of recovery espoused by Plaintiffs". 
Defendant Insurance Company further advises that it "would not 
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allow a reservation on the form . . . indicating that a particular 
appraisal being performed did not cover all the elements of 
damage sought by Plaintiffs". Defendant Insurance Company 
further refuses to allow a series of appraisals so that all claims 
of Plaintiffs could be resolved. 
(Add. 7; RII. 8-7) 
8. In Miller II, Plaintiffs also asserted that Defendant USAA had 
forfeited any right to appraisal, and that Plaintiffs claims should, therefore, be 
resolved by a court trial, and then restated the claims contained in the first action. 
Plaintiffs also added claims against the USAA adjuster, Defendant Riddle. (Add. 7; 
RII. 12-3). 
9. Following the filing of Miller II, Defendants moved to dismiss counts 
2-5 of Miller II contending they were being addressed in Miller I. (Add. 8; RII. 62 
and 1350, pages 5-6 and 10), and Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on 
their claim for Declaratory Relief. (Add. 9; RII. 226) 
10. The court considered the motions together and took oral argument 
on the motions.4 The court determined that USAA had not forfeited its right to 
4 This was the only hearing before the court in either case no. 970500080 or case 
no. 980500124. The transcript is at RII. 1350. 
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the appraisal ordered in Miller I. Counts 2 - 5 of Miller II, which were 
redundant of Miller I, were, therefore, dismissed on the grounds of res 
judicata. (Add. 11; RII. 990) The courtmled further that the appraisal was to be 
comprehensive. The court stated: 
. . . Utah Law favors the use of alternative means of dispute resolution. 
Arbitration clauses, such as the appraisal clause contained in 
Policy used by the parties, are looked upon generously by Utah 
lawmakers as a means of cutting down on litigation, and 
promoting judicial economy, [citation omitted] For that reason, 
courts in Utah tend to encourage the use of such arbitration clauses in 
insurance policies, "reflecting long-standing public policy favoring 
speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes." [citation 
omitted] There is little doubt that Judge Eves, in the previous 
action, dismissed the entire claim in keeping with this public 
policy principle. Likewise, in keeping with this principle of public 
policy, the Court hereby declares and adjudges that the appraisal 
clause be construed to allow the appraisers and the umpire to 
consider all losses claimed by the Plaintiffs resulting from the 1996 
water heater burst which flooded Plaintiffs' home. Furthermore, the 
court declares that assessment of such loss shall include all damages 
suffered by Plaintiffs from the broken water heater in the most 
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general sense, including but not limited to actual losses, expenses, 
decrease in value or resources or increase in liabilities, depletion or 
depreciation or destruction of value, deprivation, ruin, shrinkage in 
value of estate or property, or any other loss stemming from the water 
heater burst which the appraiser and umpire, in their discretion, decide 
to consider. See Black's Law Dictionary 945 (6th Ed. 1990). The 
Homeowner's Policy, which does not itself define the term "loss" 
and which places no limits on the type of losses to be considered by 
the appraisers and umpire, may reasonably be read to support 
such a definition of loss. Furthermore, it is entirely proper that 
the appraisal clause be so construed against USAA casualty, its 
drafter. 
(Add. 11, pages 989-988; RII. 989-988, italics in original, bold added) 
Furthermore, the court provided discovery by the appraisal panel "relating to loss 
suffered by Plaintiffs, defined in its broadest sense, . . ." (Add. 11, page 990 fn. 1; 
RII. 990 fn. 1, bold added) 
11. Interestingly, the court also expressly granted the appraisal panel 
discretion to determine which claims they would consider. The court stated, as also 
quoted above: 
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... Furthermore, the court declares that assessment of such loss shall 
include all damages suffered by Plaintiffs . . . which the appraiser and 
umpire, in their discretion, decide to consider... 
(Add. 11, page 988; RII. 988, bold added) 
12. Despite the broad language of the court order, quoted in Fact 10 above, 
Defendants were still contending that the appraisers could only consider those 
particular losses which Defendants contended were covered by the appraisal clause 
of the insurance policy; that is, the physical damage to the home. The court decision 
spoke of "all losses" and "all damages" and "loss . . . in its broadest sense" but did 
not specifically name the particular claims of the Plaintiffs. (See Fact 1 above) 
13. Therefore, Plaintiffs sought clarification from the court. Plaintiffs filed 
a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Clarification and/or Confirmation) to 
confirm that the appraisers had the authority to address all claims of Plaintiffs. 
(Add. 12; RII. 993 and 1018). 
14. The court refused to clarify. The court erroneously concluded, 
Plaintiffs submit, that to clarify "would undermine the authority of the panel." The 
court merely reaffirmed that the appraisers had the discretion to decide which 
13 
claims they would address and which they would not. The court also ordered 
sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel for even asking the question. The court stated: 
At this juncture, the Court wishes to bolster the authority of the 
appraisers and umpire, not to undermine it. The Court's Order 
of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, dated November 25, 
1998, was intended to extend to the appraisers and the umpire 
the discretion to determine which damages or claims would be 
appraised. The Court refuses now to take away that authority. 
After the calculation of loss is made by the appraisers and 
umpire, and not until that point, if either party is of the view that 
the calculation of loss was made in error, an appeal may be 
made to this court as provided under the Utah Arbitration Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-1, et seq. But at this point and time, 
the Court has made its ruling, and it is premature to involve 
the court before the appraisers and umpire have had the 
opportunity to perform their duties. 
(Add. 13; RII. 1073, bold added) 
15. The appraisal proceeded with an ongoing debate over the scope of the 
appraisal. The USAA appointed appraiser only appraised the property loss. The 
appraiser appointed by the Millers appraised all the claims of the plaintiffs. (RII. 
14 
1260, para. 13; 1287, para. 4; page between 1302 and 1301; 1294-1293, response to 
Defendants' Fact 4) 
16. The panel exercised the discretion given them by the trial court and 
deferred back to the trial court the resolution of the bulk of the claims. The panel 
stated: 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-
contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive damages, emotional 
distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The 
panel as a whole is generally hesitant to embark on the laborious task 
of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do 
so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having 
Plaintiffs5 claims heard by one body or another. It is the intent of this 
panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to 
preserve any properly brought claims. The panel will take any action 
to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant 
to Court Order and has chosen to only appraise property damage 
within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all 
claims, damages, and losses, including but not limited to any extra-
15 
contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-
contractual claims be determined through a court trial process, rather 
than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the 
insurance policy. 
(Add. 1;RI.98;RII. 1104) 
The panel further found that USAA owed the Millers $40,880 for "property damage 
within the limits of the policy." (Add. 1; RI. 98; RIL 1104) 
17. Both parties received copies of the LIMITED APPRAIS A L AWARD 
on December 17, 1999. (RII. 1259, para. 16; 1201-1198) 
18. USAA promptly paid the $40,880 monetary award. (RII. 1287, para. 5; 
1259, para. 17) 
19. Defendants filed no motion to vacate or modify the LIMITED 
APPRAISAL AWARD. 
20. On December 27, 1999 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Conference to 
"confer on the forum and schedule for resolving the remaining claims of plaintiffs" 
(Add. 14; RI. 101; RII. 1107) as unanimously directed by the panel of appraisers 
and umpire. (Add. 1; RI 98; RII. 1104) 
16 
21. After waiting for the 20 days to expire during which a party is allowed 
to challenge an arbitration award under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3 la-14 
and -15, Plaintiffs, on January 18, 2000, filed their Motion to Confirm the award 
and to schedule the trial on the remaining claims. (Add. 15; RI. 104; RII. 1197) 
22. Defendants filed oppositions to both the motion for a conference and 
the motion to confirm. (RII. 1124 and 1289) 
23. The court had the clerk call counsel for each party to request that 
each submit an order reflecting how it thought the court should rule. Each party 
submitted a proposed order. (RII. 1305, 1309-1306, 1317, and 1343-1337) 
24. On March 10, 2000, the court entered the order submitted by 
Defendants. (Add. 16; RII. 1343) 
25. On March 23,2000, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal of the 
March 10, 2000 order. (Add. 17; RI. 108; RII. 1346) 
26. On March 24, 2000, Plaintiffs filed an amended Notice of Appeal, 
which also specified the intent to challenge some of the prior interlocutory orders. 
(Add. 18; RII 10; RII. 1348) 
27. On April 6, 2000, Plaintiffs filed, in this Court, their Motion for Relief 
From Order entered in "Manifest Error." 
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28. On April 19, 2000, Defendants filed, in this Court, a Motion for 
Summary Disposition, contending that this Court "lacks jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal based on Appellants' failure to file their Notice of Appeal within 30 days of 
the judgment appealed from, as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure." 
29. On May 1, 2000, this Court deferred ruling on the two motions and 
directed that the parties address the issues raised in the motions in their briefs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs timely 
appealed the March 10, 2000 order. All prior orders were interlocutory. In each 
case, the action and claims resolution was continuing. 
The court erred in refusing to provide a forum to address Plaintiffs' 
remaining claims. The court granted the appraisers the discretion to determine 
which claims should be appraised and which should be returned to the court for 
resolution. The appraisers referred the extra-contractual claims back to the court for 
resolution. The court erred in holding that "there are no pending claims to be further 
IX 
considered." Plaintiffs have never had a hearing on their remaining claims. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing on their remaining claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court has Jurisdiction to consider this Appeal and give 
Plaintiffs Relief. 
This issue is addressed because Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of this 
Court in their Motion for Summary Disposition, contending that Plaintiffs' appeal 
was untimely. The court, by order of May 1, 2000, directed that the parties address, 
in the briefs, the issues raised in the motions. 
Plaintiffs' appeal is timely, and is of the first final order in Miller II. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs had no need to appeal the August 17, 1997 order in Miller I, 
which ordered appraisal of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs were willing to participate 
in an appraisal of all their claims. 
Plaintiffs present four separate arguments, each independently establishing 
the jurisdiction of this Court. First, Plaintiffs timely appealed the March 10, 2000 
trial court order denying confirmation of an arbitration award. Second, Plaintiffs 
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timely appealed the March 10, 2000 trial court order dismissing the case. Third, the 
prior November 25, 1998 and January 22, 1999 orders were interlocutory, (a) under 
case law, (b) in the view of the trial court, (c) and by Defendants' own admission. 
Plaintiffs timely appealed the first final order, the order of March 10, 2000. Fourth, 
and finally, Plaintiffs timely "appealed" the appraisal award to the trial court and 
timely appealed the trial court's dismissal of that "appeal" of the appraisal award. 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
Argument 1. On March 23, 2000 Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal (Add. 
17; RI. 108; RII. 1346) from the March 10, 2000 order denying confirmation of an 
arbitration award. (Add. 16; RII. 1343) That order is appealable pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-3la-19 and otherwise. The appeal was timely. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' appeal. 
Argument 2. Following the issuance of the appraisal award (Add. 1; RI. 98; 
RII. 1104), Plaintiffs filed a motion to set a forum and schedule for resolution of the 
remaining claims. (Add. 14; RI. 101; RII. 1107) Plaintiffs also filed a motion to 
confirm the award and schedule a trial as set out in the award. (Add. 15; RI. 104; 
RII. 1197) In response, the court dismissed the action by order of March 10, 2000. 
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(Add. 16; RIL 1343) Plaintiffs timely appealed the March 10 final order of 
dismissal. (Add. 17; RI. 108; RIL 1346) This Court has jurisdiction. 
Argument 3. The orders of November 25, 1998 (Add. 11; RIL 991) and 
January 22, 1999 (Add. 13; RIL 1073) were interlocutory and Plaintiffs were not 
obligated to appeal them within 30 days of those dates. Those orders, among other 
things, set out the procedure for the arbitration of the still pending claims. 
(a) The prior decisions of this Court support Plaintiffs' contention that 
the November 25,1998 and January 22,1999 orders were interlocutory. 
Following the issuance of these orders, the parties, under the direction of the 
District Court, participated in the arbitration. As stated in Tippets v. Page 
Petroleum, Inc., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987), "A final judgment is one which ends 
the litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution." At the time these 
orders were entered, the litigation had not ended. Claims remained for resolution. 
Therefore, those orders did not constitute a "final judgment." 
In All Weather Insulation, Inc. v. Amiron Development Corpy 702 P.2d 
1176, 1177 (Utah 1985), this Court stated: 
Parties to a suit generally are entitled to only one appeal as a matter of 
right, regardless of the number of parties or issues presented for 
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disposition. An appeal can be taken only from the entry of a judgment 
that finally concludes the action. 
The order "that finally concludefd] the action" was issued on March 10, 2000, from 
which a timely appeal was taken. Neither the November 25, 1998 order or the 
January 22, 1999 order "finally conclude[d] the action." 
In Olson v. Salt Lake City School District 724 P.2d 960, 964 - 965 (Utah, 
1986), this court spoke of "finality" and of its necessity before an appeal was 
appropriate. Therein the court stated: 
'Finality'... is usually defined as a judgment 'which ends the litigation 
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment [citations omitted]'. 
As stated by then Judge and now Justice Wilkins in In re Southern American 
Insurance Company, Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Utah Insurance 
Commissioner, 930 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah App. 1996): 
Under the final judgment rule, an appeal is improper if it is taken from 
an order or judgment that is not final, [citations omitted] For a 
judgment or order to be final it "must dispose of the case...and finally 
dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the 
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case.' [citations omitted] In other words, a judgment is final when it 
'ends the controversy between the parties litigant.' 
In this case, the March 10, 2000 order "end[ed] the controversy between the parties 
litigant." No judgment was final until that time. 
It would have been contrary to judicial economy for Plaintiffs to have 
appealed prior to this time. As stated by Justice Russon in Mackay v. Hardy973 
P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998) 
...Judicial economy and the parties' interests in the finality of 
judgments are in no way furthered if parties are allowed to engage in 
piecemeal appeals. 
(b) The District Court even affirmed that the November 25,1998 order 
was interlocutory. Following receipt of the November 25, 1998 order, Plaintiffs 
timely filed a Motion to Alter or Amend. Plaintiffs sought clarification of the order. 
(Add. 12; RII. 993) The Court refused holding that Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or 
Amend was premature. The court stated: 
At this juncture, the Court wishes to bolster the authority of the 
appraisers and umpire, not to undermine it. The Court's Order 
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of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment dated November 25, 
1998, was intended to extend to the appraisers and the umpire 
the discretion to determine which damages or claims would be 
appraised. The Court refuses now to take away that authority. 
After the calculation of loss is made by the appraisers and 
umpire, and not until that point, if either party is of the view 
that the calculation of loss was made in error, an appeal may 
be made to this court as provided under the Utah Arbitration 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-1, et seq. But at this point and 
time, the Court has made its ruling, and it is premature to 
involve the court before the appraisers and umpire have had 
the opportunity to perform their duties. 
(Add. 13;RII. 1073) 
The January 21, 1999 order was a result of a timely Motion to Amend the 
November 25, 1998 order. 
Should Plaintiffs have appealed the January 21, 1999 order? The January 21, 
1999 order told the parties to wait and if you have questions after the appraisal, then 
ask, but "not until that point." As such, nothing was final. There was no "finality". 
(c) Defendants admit that the November 25,1998 and the January 21, 
1999 orders did not resolve all claims. Defendants concede that Plaintiffs claim 
for "property damage within the limits of the policy" survived the November 25, 
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1998 and January 22, 1999 orders and was to be appraised. (RII. 1122 para. 4, 1287 
para. 4) As such, without the required Rule 54(b) language, the orders were i t 
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Company 692 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984) ("An 
order that is "final" as to a claim or a party in a multi-claim or multi-party suit is 
appealable under Rule 54(b) only if it is accompanied by a district court 
certification that no just reason exists for delaying the appeal: inci I heuiuse a 
(rial court recites that <iii uidu appeals! hum i , I ml dm:» not m IIM" it ,n ""'p 11 i 
Nmembei ,! i ir'HK i in l I inuais l(^(> orders ronhin in K'liiiu1 > l ihi crliiiiiiMliuiiii 
language iiinl'IVIMT1 I heir Ion? not appealable. 
Plaintiffs timely appealed from the final order of March 10, 2000. This Court 
has jurisdiction. 
Argument 4. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were required to "appeal" the 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD within 20 days. While Plaintiffs disagree with 
Defendants' contention, Plaintiffs did, in iact '"'appear iliai juani \ ill m J!t) iki>s. 
1
 )nc geiieialh "'•appeals*'* if one \ lullenges ,i den >IUI> 1 lie November ? \ 
1998 nfdel ^fkd 
Finally, the Court directs that after the appraisers and umpire 
have made a final calculation of loss, then and only then may 
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their decision be appealed to this court for modification-but 
only within 20 days of the decision. The standard of 
modification shall be based upon "evident mistake" or "evident 
miscalculation." See Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-15. The 
appraisers and the umpire shall be given broad discretion and 
general deference in their decision making ability. 
(Add. 11,RII. 991) 
The January 21, 1999 order further explained when an "appeal" from the panel's 
decision would be appropriate. The court stated: 
At this juncture, the Court wishes to bolster the authority of the 
appraisers and umpire, not to undermine it. The Court's Order 
of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, dated November 25, 
1998, was intended to extend to the appraisers and the umpire 
the discretion to determine which damages or claims would be 
appraised. The Court refuses now to take away that authority. 
After the calculation of loss is made by the appraisers and 
umpire, and not until that point, if either party is of the view 
that the calculation of loss was made in error, an appeal may 
be made to this court as provided under the Utah 
Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-l, et seq. But at 
this point and time, the Court has made its ruling, and it is 
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prematiire to involve the court before the appraisers and umpire 
have had the opportunity to perform then 
(Add. 13; RII. 1073, bold added) 
Plaintiffs did not contend there was an "evident mistake," "evident 
miscalculation/' or "that the calculation of loss was made in error." Plaintiffs, 
therefore, had no need to appeal that order. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did ..J , 2 /, 
1999 ^Ada. 1 
a s k e < - * •,: • -e remaining claims 
of Plaintiffs in con form; i nee with the appraisal award. That Motion constitutes an 
"appeal," to the extent such an action was necessary. By the Motion for Conference, 
Plaintiffs appealed to the court to implement the award. That satisfies any "appeal" 
obligation of Plaintiffs. Buzas Baseball, Inc v. Salt Lake Trappers, InQ.925 
941 , Q 4 7 f i i 4 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs also sought . . 
I I ' ' /1 I heie ts mi liinr 11111 in I In HI mi (mi mi Piiidiu1 ili< l.ilrs tlnl niir <\«nl 1^1 d i\s 
be t< >i'i: I i I iiI i» ., i 11 nil i<»11 I i i mli nI i «i n i\i h11 r11111111 , i " ; 11• < I I"hat allows time for the 
I'KIIIH'S \(\ in |i|ciinMii .IINI «Hifisf\ an award without court intervention and also 
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insures that there is no motion to vacate or modify under Utah Code Annotated 
sections 78-3 la-14 and/or -15 filed in responses 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant Plaintiffs the 
relief they seek. 
II. The Court Erred by Refusing to Provide a Forum to Address 
Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims. 
Plaintiffs have claims yet to be resolved. They are set forth in Plaintiffs' 
complaint in Civil no. 970500080, Miller I, (Add. 2; RI. 6) and also described in 
Civil no. 980500124 CN, Miller II (Add. 7; RII. 12). They are referenced in the 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD. (Add. 1) They are a consequence of 
Defendants' failure to investigate the claim of the Millers and to pay for the damage 
that resulted. Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1995). 
See also, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) and 
860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). 
5 Of course, the opposing party could have filed a motion to vacate or modify prior 
to that time, but to wait eliminates the right of a party opposing the confirmation of 
an award to file a motion to vacate if it was not done earlier. 
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The remaining claims include all the claims listed in Fact 1 except part of 
subparts a. and1_ The Millers sought recovery for 
a Physical damage to the home 
b I -oss :)f 1 lse of tl: le 1: lome -;.. ^ -•'• . •. • ... 
• ::; I lental and en lotioi la 1 distress • 
" il'1.* .- r distress 
e. frustration and embarrassment 
f". Infliction of emotional distress 
g. Bad Faith 
It Punitive damages 
i.... Other special, general and consequential damages 
all arising from the bursting of a waler lieulu m iln Millu lioi r in liiiiiin I'S'in \ \vv 
I del i M hn\ |MIi ui i.hii)mi J iiihin Iin.ii1 » Ivniii mlulivssni Iln p.int'l ni tppraisers 
deferred tl: ic: i: emainii ig back to t! :i.e ti ial coui t for resolution. The trial court refused 
and dismissed the action. That was error. 
iL Plaintiffs have been denied due process. Due process requires that 
litigants have their day in court." Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Brunp735 P.2d 
387, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Due process requires a " basic fairness of 
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procedure," In re: Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996). Due process " rests 
upon basic fairness," Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs have never had their day in court on their breach of contract and extra-
contractual claims. 
The procedure, as controlled and directed by the District Court, did not 
provide for the resolution of all Plaintiffs'claims. That was error. 
B. The court ordered all Plaintiffs' claims to be appraised, but then 
refused to enforce that order or provide another forum. Plaintiffs had 
reasonably understood the court order of August 21, 1997 (Add. 4; RI. 41) to mean 
that all claims were to be resolved by appraisal. The underlying motion of 
Defendant USAA made no distinction between the various claims of Plaintiffs 
(Add. 3; RI. 15-10), nor did the resulting order. (Add. 4; RI. 41) The claims were to 
be appraised. The court order of November 25, 1998 reaffirmed this understanding. 
The court declared: 
...Utah law favors the use of alternative means of dispute resolution. 
Arbitration clauses, such as the appraisal clause contained in 
Policy used by the parties, are looked upon generously by Utah 
lawmakers as a means of cutting down on litigation, and 
promoting judicial economy. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-3. For 
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that reason, courts in Utah tend to encourage the use of such arbitration 
clauses ii 1 ii ISI n ai ice policies, "reflecting loi lg stai iding pi iblic policy . 
favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes." 
See Allred v educators Mutual Ins, Asc" n uiutan, 909 P.2d 1263 
(Utah 1996. There is little doubt that Judge Eves, in the previous 
action, dismissed the entire claim in keeping with this public policy 
principle [favoring arbitration]. lAeni^i1 HI LqiuiL' '» iilh llmr. 
principle of public policy, the Court hereby declares and adjudges 
that the ap ppraisers and 
the umpire to consider all losses claimed by the Plaintiffs resulting 
atei .heater burst which flooded Plaintiffs' home... 
(Add 11 page 99, - •:>'-. , RII, page 9^7 - WX, IK >id added) 
«i.o court thereby .-, . 
• i - f * iippr.iisal 
would consider and which they would 
return to the court for resolution. (See Facts 11 16) 
The panel of appraisers and umpire exercised the discretion given them and 
chose not to appraise certain of the claims holding that it was "more appropriate 
that the extra-contractual claims be determined through a court trial process, rather 
than an appraisal process." (Add. ) 
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Nevertheless, the court refused to schedule a trial or provide another forum to 
resolve those claims. That was error. 
C. The August 21,1997 and the November 25,1998 orders did not 
bar consideration of all Plaintiffs' claims except the property damage claim 
within the limits of the policy, as later found by the trial court Instead, as 
quoted above, the November 25, 1998 order reaffirmed the appraisability of all 
Plaintiffs' claims as found in the August 21, 1997 order. The November 25, 1998 
order supplemented the August 21, 1997 referral to appraisal. 
D. The dismissal in the November 25,1998 order was only of the 
restatement of Plaintiffs' claims in Miller II. In Miller II, Plaintiffs restated its 
claims, both contractual and extra-contractual, contending that Defendants had 
forfeited any right to the appraisal procedure and that a court trial should resolve 
Plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Defendants had not forfeited their right to 
the appraisal process. The court, therefore, declared the comprehensiveness of the 
appraisal and dismissed the balance of Miller II because Plaintiffs' claims were 
already part of Miller I which had been referred to appraisal. 
The dismissal in Miller II did not impair the August 17, 1997 order to 
appraise all Plaintiffs' claims. (Add. 4; RI. 41) If fact, Judge Braithwaite, in the 
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iNuv ember 25, 1998 order, reaffirmed that all Plaintiffs' claims had been ordered to 
appraisal by Judge Eves in Miller I. 
The November 25, 1998 order is erroneous if it is interpreted as a dismissal 
of all Plaintiffs' claims or all Plaintiffs' claims except the property damage claim 
within the limits of the policy. 
if, as the court finally ruiea . . . . . . - f 
i then the court 
should have said that in response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend. The 
issue was squarely before the court. 
The November 25, 1998 order did not specify by name, count, or can *• of 
action the claims of Plaintiffs that were to be appraised. It said the appraisal was of 
"all losses" and "all damages." Yet Defendants were still contending that the 
appraisal only included the property damage. As a i esiilt, Plaii itiffs sc i ight 
i Ill Til , iiii lihl" I III!1 .'\lrii-* oiijiMrliul i, lairns. if the answer were ho" then 
Plair-i - * - r iave sought to appeal that interlocutory order. If the answer were 
"yes" then the issue would be clarified. The court did not say ho" or "yes", but 
explained that "After the calculation of loss is made by the appraisers and umpire, 
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and not until that point..." would the court comment. 
Again, Plaintiffs followed the direction of the court. The appraisers issued 
their award. The appraisers addressed certain of the claims and deferred the 
remaining to the court. Thereafter, Plaintiffs requested the court to set a hearing on 
the remaining claims in accordance with the appraisal award. The court refused. 
That was error. This appeal promptly followed. 
III. The Court erred by not Confirming the Appraisal Award. 
The final court order of March 10, 2000 states that the request to confirm the 
appraisal award was moot because Defendants had paid the monetary award. The 
award, however, had findings beyond the monetary award. Section 78-3 la-12 of 
the Utah Code directs the court to confirm the LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
after "20 days notice to all parties." The referenced Code section reads: 
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
the confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice to all parties, the 
court shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate 
or modify the award. 
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Defendants made no motion to vacate or modify the award. Sections 78-3 la-
14 and -15 of the (Jtah Code require that any motion to vacate or modify be made 
within 20 days of service of the award. Defendants received a copy of the award on 
December 17 1999. (Fact 17) The Utah Supreme Court stated in Buzas Baseball v. 
Salt Lake Trappers, 925 ... -* 
j . i e a w q r d : r . 
A1-, sin 11 H u-;,s 01T(ii for the • confirm the LIMITED 
APPRAISE AWARD. 
C. Plaintiffs are Entitled to an Award of Fees. 
In the trial court, Plaintiffs requested an award of attorney fees, contending 
that Defendants had improperly continued to frustrate the resolution of Plaintiffs' 
claims. (Add. 1 
piocess by nm\ mi' i ' i>|. r ilu .ippnusiil ILIIIM.1 m icsnh v Pl.nnlilTs entire 
cnniplainl in Miller | | | r , ninl granted USAA's Motion by Order of August 21, 
1997. Since that time Defendants have opposed and resisted Plaintiffs' efforts to 
have the appraisal include all of Plaintiffs' claims. This Court's Order of Dismissal 
and Declaratory Judgment, dated November 25, 1998, reaffirmed that the appraisal 
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should include all of Plaintiffs' claims, as Defendant USAA had requested in its 
motion. Yet even thereafter Defendants failed to follow the August 17, 1997 and 
the November 25, 1998 orders of the court and argued to the appraisers that they 
had no authority to address the "extra-contractual" claims. The appraisers 
unanimously rejected Defendants' position, yet Defendants still failed to cooperate 
in the resolution of the "extra-contractual" claims. Defendants did not seek a review 
of or challenge the LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD. Instead Defendants 
continued to resist even the scheduling of a conference to address these matters. 
These actions of Defendants were all inconsistent with Defendant USAA's motion 
to refer this entire matter to appraisal and were all inconsistent with the August 21, 
1997 Order and the November 25, 1998 Order. These inconsistent actions of 
Defendants have necessarily caused Plaintiffs to incur significant fees and costs, not 
to mention the improper delay in the resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants 
even opposed the confirmation of the appraisal award. Therefore, assuming that this 
Court reverses the March 10, 2000 order, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of fees. 
Utah Code annotated, section 78-3 la-16, Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trapperfi925 
P.2d 941 at 953 (Utah 1996). 
These practices have continued in this Court with Defendants' frivolous 
motions to Strike, for Summary Disposition, and even opposing Plaintiffs' 
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Designation of the Record. Plaintiffs should, therefore, be granted reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred since August 21, 1997 in responding to the 
actions of Defendants that were inconsistent with the August 21., II99 „ order that all 
Plaintiffs5 claims be resolved b> appi aisal. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request the Court to reverse the order of March 10, 2000, remand 
the case to the District court for resolution of the remaining claims of Plaintiffs, and 
award Plaintiffs attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z ^ day of August, 2000 
Lynn B. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ 'Wiay of August, 2000, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants including the Addendum was hand 
delivered to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By^) / Vfl)*-
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ADDENDUM 
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Tabl 
Re: USAA MEMBER: 
USAA NUMBER: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
LOSS LOCATION: 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
PAUL & KATHY MILLER 
10881638 
6-24-96 
PAROWAN, UTAH 
We, the appraisal panel in the above-referenced matter have met and conferred on this set of claims, and iointlv 
submit this Limited Appraisal Award: ' y 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual claims, (e.g., bad faith punitive 
damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' claims heard by one body or 
another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court Order and has chosen to only 
appraise property damage within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all other claims, damages and 
losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual 
claims be determined through a court trail process, rather than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy. 
WHEREFORE, we make the following limited award: 
Loss of Use of Real Property: 
Personal Property: 
Executed this 
$32,500 
5,880 
2,500 
AWARD: $40,880 
o: December, 1999 at Salt Lake City, I Jtah. 
The^Honorable Jam^Sawaya 
5urt-Appointed Umpire 
Edward H. Cross, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insureds 
Steve Love, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insurer 
Addendum 1 
'MIS 
Re: USAA MEMBER: 
USAA NUMBER: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
LOSS LOCATION: 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
PAUL & KATHY MILLER 
10881638 
6-24-96 
PAROWAN, UTAH 
We, the appraisal panel in the above-referenced matter have met and conferred on this s:et of claims, and jointly 
submit this Limited Appraisal Award: 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive 
damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' claims heard by one body or 
another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court Order and has chosen to only 
appraise property damage within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all other claims, damages and 
losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual 
claims be determined through a court trail process, rather than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy. 
WHEREFORE, we make the following limited award: 
Real Property Damage: $32,500 
Loss of Use of Real Property: 5,880 
Personal Property: 2,500 
AWARD: $40,880 
Executed this 17th day of December, 1999 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Theffionorable Jameg^Sawaya 
Surt-Appointed Umpire 
/ EdwardH. Cross, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insureds 
Steve Love, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insurer 
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Daniel F. Bertch (4728) 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
5296 South 300 West, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-5300 
Facsimile: (801)262-2111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
rivTSl ob' 1 'Lut 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
(Jury Demanded) 
Case No. ^ ^ G S ) ^ 
Judge: 6U& 
COME NOW Plaintiffs and complain of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Iron County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is an insurance corporation doing business in Iron County, Utah. 
VENUE/JURISDICTION 
3 The acts, events or transactions complained of occurred in Iron County, Utah. 
4. The amount in controversy does exceed $20,000 00, exclusive of attorney fees and costs. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5 Prior to June 14, 1996, Plaintiffs had purchased a policy of homeowners insurance from 
Addendum 2 OOOOB 
Defendant, insuring Plaintiffs' heme at 694 West 200 North, in Parowan, Utah. 
6. On June 14, 1996, Plaintiffs suffered a sudden flood of water in their basement. 
7. This flood of water caused serious, permanent damage to the basement, including the 
walls, floors, and personal property present in the basement. 
8. Plaintiffs gave prompt and timely notice of the loss to Defendant. 
9. Plaintiffs have paid all premiums in a timely manner. 
10. Defendant has inspected the damage to Plaintiffs' property, yet has failed to pay to repair 
or replace the damaged portion of the home. 
11. As a direct result of Defendant's failure to pay, the basement has developed molds, that 
are causing illness to Plaintiffs and their family. 
12. Because of the unhealthy condition of the home, Plaintiffs have been forced to move to a 
temporary residence elsewhere. 
13. Further, Plaintiffs have been forced to incur expense for the repair of the home. 
14. The delay and failure of Defendant to investigate and settle this claim has caused 
Plaintiffs mental and emotional distress. Further, it has caused physical illness and 
distress. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract) 
IS Defendant owed Plaintiffs a contractual duty to investigate and settle the claim of 
Plaintiffs in a prompt and timely manner. Further, Defendant owed Plaintiffs a duty to act 
in good faith, and to deal fairly with them Defendant breached those duties by, among 
other things: 
a. Failing to pay for complete replacement of the water-damaged portion of 
Plaintiffs' home, and their water-damaged personal property; 
00003 
b. Failing to promptly investigate and pay the claim, 
c. Other acts 
16 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breaches of contract, Plaintiffs have been 
damaged as follows 
a. Mental and emotional distress, 
b. Physical illness and distress, 
c. Loss of use of their home, 
d. Anger, frustration, and embarrassment, 
e. Pecuniary loss for the repair and replacement of water-damaged property; 
f. Other special, general and consequential damages. 
17 Plaintiffs1 injuries were directly and proximately caused by the breaches of contract of 
Defendant 
COUNT TWO 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
18 Defendant's refusal to pay insurance benefits has created severe mental and physical 
distress on Plaintiffs. 
19 Defendant knew or should have known that its failure to pay benefits would cause 
benefits Plaintiffs have advised Defendant of the condition of their home, including the 
mold buildup, yet Defendant has done nothing more for them. 
20 Defendant's conduct is intolerable and outrageous, and was done with actual or implied 
malice, and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' health and their rights. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
HAVING COMPLAINED of Defendant, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
A For special damages in an amount exceeding $15,000 00, to be proven at trial, 
B. For general damages, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact, 
C. For punitive damages, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact, 
D. For pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney fees, and such other relief 
as may be just and equitable to the Court 
DATED this Seventeenth day of January, 1997 
Daniel F Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs reside at: 
694 West 200 North 
Parowan, UT 84761 
Tab 3 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A 1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
USAA 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 970500080 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
USAA hereby moves to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds that the policy 
sued upon contains an appraisal clause which USAA has invoked. This Motion is supported 
by a Memorandum which more fully sets forth the basis of this Motion. 
DATED this Z\ ^'day of March, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MAjRTINEAU 
Robert H. HeiWerscft 
Attorneys for Defendant USAA 
Addendum 3 00015 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
Donna L. Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law offices of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendant herein; that she served the attached 
MOTION TO DISMISS (Case Number 970500080 Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
5296 South 300 West, Sutie 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on thg7S^l day of March, 
1997. alhtAu ^(%Ja(l-
Donna L. Campbell ( J 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thiso^M day of March, 1997. 
s^e^ 
NOTARY 0OBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
S&:±$l NOTARY VMUftl.iC Afc^£$t\ Margo O. Colegrovc 
{'*[**? s*">k>A 10 Exchange PI S*o J1C0 
\*[ f«< %' A* r ! Salt La^ C»!y V'nb °4V>', 
\* \V^i i '<* jx* W y Commission ..vf w 
Soptombor *9, »993 
STATE OV UTAH 
000.14 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A 1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
USAA 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE APPRAISAL CLAUSE 
This case arises out of a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant, USAA, over 
the amount of loss arising from a broken water heater in their home. The plaintiffs have a 
Homeowner's policy with defendant USAA. 
:
-' ,Y 11 it 
Civil No. 970500080 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
00013 
The Millers/USAA homeowner's policy contains an appraisal clause, which specifically 
provides: 
If you and we . . . do not agree on the amount of 
loss, either party can demand that the amount of 
the loss be determined by appraisal. 
The appraisal clause then sets forth the procedure by which the loss will be determined. 
USAA has invoked the appraisal clause. (See letter of March 21, 1997 attached hereto as 
Exhibit" A".) 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH CASE LAW, AND AS A 
MATTER OF CONTRACT RIGHT, USAA IS 
ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL. 
It is black letter law that the law favors contractual provisions covering the resolution 
of future disputes. Allred v. Educator's Mutual Insurance Association. 282 Utah Advanced 
Reporter 3 (Utah 1996). Here, the insured, plaintiffs Miller, and the insurer, USAA, have a 
written contract which clearly provides that either party to the contract may invoke the 
appraisal process for resolution of a dispute over the amount of the loss. USAA has invoked 
the appraisal clause. The dispute should be resolved via the appraisal process, and this Court 
should dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint. 
- 2 -
00012 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant USAA's Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs Complaint 
against USAA should, therefore, be granted. 
DATED this 2~l day of March, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSE ARTINEAU 
^bertHfi. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant USAA 
- 3 - 00011 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna L. Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law offices of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendant herein; that she served the attached 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS (Case Number 970500080 F,fth 
Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
5296 South 300 West, Sutie 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the^k^/ck 
1997. 
Donna L. Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ ^ / d a y of March, 1997. 
y of March, 
NOTARY^fUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY y* :>i ic 
V V^l -v* ^ A / My Commfisicri i_*p res 
September 19 1993 
STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 Q 
Tab 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 970500080 CV 
5th JUDICIAL DIST COURT " * > * < W , M * 
1 ? j&> 
AUG 2 11997 
-CLERk 
DEPUTY 
This matter came before the Court this date for ruling on defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, filed March 24, 1997. No response has ever been filed to the Motion by plaintiffs. 
Defendant seeks dismissal because the insurance policy from which the dispute arises 
contains an appraisal clause to be used to resolve issues as to the amount of loss. Defendant 
has "invoked" the clause. 
The Court finds that the parties are bound by contract to settle the dispute in this case 
by appraisal. Accordingly, this case is hereby ordered dismissed. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
75 ILIP EVES/Z>istrict Court Judge 
00041 
Addendum 4 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of August 1997,1 mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Daniel F. Bertch, Esq. 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
5296 South 300 West, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Richard M. Hutchins, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
40 E. St. George Blvd. #300 
St. George, UT 84770 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
000 
Tab 5 
Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
vs. : 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY : 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs, Paul and Kathy Miller, through counsel, move this Court for an order 
reinstating this matter and request that a trial date be set. 
On or about August 21, 1997, this Court entered an Order of Dismissal so that the parties 
could resolve their disputes pursuant to the appraisal process set forth in the contract between the 
parties. The dismissal followed the filing of a Motion to Dismiss by defendant, which was not 
opposed by plaintiffs. 
Since the dismissal, plaintiffs and defendant have sought to come to an agreement on the 
form of appraisal and the issues to be resolved. They have not been able to come to an 
agreement. 
00955 
Addendum 5 
4^ --— 
Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, seek damages resulting from defendant's failure "to pay for 
a complete replacement of the water-damaged portion of plaintiffs' home, and their water-
damaged personal property", among other things (Complaint 1 15). As a result, mold built up 
within the home resulted in physical illness and distress, the loss of use of the home, et al. 
Plaintiffs have been informed that their physical illnesses result from the mold and fungi 
which have grown within the home resulting from the moisture and the failure to repair. Plaintiffs 
have been further advised that because of the extent of the mold, plaintiffs and their family should 
not return to the home. By its suit, plaintiffs have sought to recover for these damages 
(Complaint 11 16-20). 
Nevertheless, defendant seeks a form of appraisal which disregards all damages sought by 
plaintiffs except for the cost "to repair or replace the damage to the Miller's building" (See 
Exhibit 1). 
Plaintiffs suggested a modification to the form allowing a reservation of the other damages 
sought by plaintiffs in this matter (See Exhibit 2). Plaintiffs added language stating: 
"The appraisal. . . shall not include damages associated with fungi, 
impairment of health, loss of use, additional and/or temporary 
living expense, rental costs, hidden decay and other damages. 
These elements of loss shall be determined by other appraisers, the 
court or as the parties may hereafter determine." 
The appraisers were also to do the following: 
". . . make a separate appraisal of loss presuming the entire 
structure must be demolished, and disposed of as may possibly be 
required 
Defendant rejected the modification. 
2 
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Following the rejection by defendant, counsel for each party met and conferred to see if 
any accommodation could be reached. 
At the meeting, counsel for defendant indicated that he would not agree to any form which 
would give any credence to the theories of recovery alleged by plaintiffs. This was confirmed by 
letter which stated in pertinent part: 
"Thank you for meeting with me yesterday morning. 
At that time you [counsel for defendant] re-affirmed your rejection 
of the appraisal form, indicating that you had no intent to agree to 
any form which would give any credence to the theories of recovery 
alleged by plaintiffs. You further indicated that you would not 
agree to the form even if the statement were added that defendant 
was not in any way acknowledging or agreeing to the viability of 
the theories of recovery espoused by plaintiffs. 
You further advised that you would not allow a reservation on the 
form you proposed indicating that the particular appraisal being 
performed did not cover all of the elements of damage sought by 
plaintiff. 
My understanding of your objections is that you intended to do 
nothing which might foster the credibility of plaintiffs or their 
claims". (See Exhibit 3) 
Since that time plaintiffs have proposed a series of appraisals so that all claims of plaintiffs 
could be resolved. Defendant rejected that idea. 
The parties, therefore, are at a dead lock on how to resolve the several claims of plaintiffs. 
The only feasible method for plaintiffs to have their claims heard and resolved would be a trial 
before this Court. 
3 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reinstate this matter before the 
Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of December, 1997. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
pnn'B. Larse 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the^J/i^l day of December, 1997, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Reinstatement was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Byr'^^\
 v A rJU^ S <C£- L 
Is\lbl\miller\reinstat.mot 
4 
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FORM FOR DETERMINATION OF AWARD BY APPRAISAL 
I. RECITALS 
Whereas Paul and Kathryn Miller ("the Millers") are insured under a USAA Casualty 
Insurance Company (tcUSAA") homeowner's policy packet which provides, subject to its terms, 
conditions, and limitations, certain coverage; and whereas on June 14, 1996, the Millers' water 
heater ruptured, resulting in damage in the basement of the Millers' home; and whereas the 
Millers and USAA were unable to agree on the amount of loss; and whereas the Millers filed a 
lawsuit in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Iron County, State of Utah, 
Civil Number 970500080CV; and whereas USAA invoked the appraisal clause in the policy by 
letter dated March 20, 1997, and moved to dismiss the Millers' lawsuit; and whereas The 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge, ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs' lawsuit by 
Order dated August 21, 1997; and whereas by letter dated March 28, 1997, USAA selected 
Kenneth G. Riddle as its appraiser; Now, therefore: 
II. SELECTION OF THE 
MILLER'S APPRAISER 
The Millers hereby select as their appraiser. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
Paul Miller Kathryn Miller 
UI. SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT 
OF UMPIRE 
USAA's appraiser, Kenneth G. Riddle, and the Millers' appraiser, , hereby 
select and appoint to act as umpire to settle matters of difference that exist 
between the Millers and USAA. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
IV. AMOUNT OF LOSS 
The amount of loss shall be the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace 
the damage to the Millers' building caused by the broken water heater. 
EXH'Brr "1" 0005 
A. If the two appraisers are able to agree on the amount of loss, they should write the 
agreed upon amount of loss in the following blank: $ and sign below: 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
B. If the two appraisers are unable to agree on the amount of loss, they will submit their 
differences to the umpire. Two of the three of the two appraisers and the umpire shall set the 
amount of loss, and shall write the amount of the loss in the following blank: $ 
This shall be signed by all three, if all three agree to it, or by any two of the three that do agree to 
it in the space below: 
Dated this day of , 1997. Umpire 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
V. AWARD 
The amount of loss determined above shall be reduced by the $500 deductible as set forth 
in the policy. The Award is, therefore, $ (the amount of loss set by the Appraisal, 
i.e., the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the damage, minus the $500 
deductible). Again, this shall be signed by all three, if all three agree to it, or by any two of the 
three that do agree to it in the space below. 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Umpire 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
00030 
FORM FOR DETERMINATION OF AWARD OF DAMAGfc TU 
STRUCTURE BY APPRAISAL 
Whereas Paul and Kathryn Miller • ler a USAA Casualty 
Insurance Company ("USAA") homeowner's puu^
 t >, subject to its terms, 
conditions, and limitations, certain coverage; and whereas on Kru: 14, ;^% the Millers" water 
heater ruptured, resulting in damage in the basement of the Millers' home; and whereas the 
Millers and USAA were unable to agree on the amount of loss; and whereas the Miners filed a 
lawsuit in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Iron County, State of Utah, 
Civil Number 97050008OCV; and whereas USAA invoked the appraisal clause in the policy by 
letter dated March 20, 1997, and moved to dismiss the Millers' lawsuit; and whereas The 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge, ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs' lawsuit by 
Order dated August 21, 1997, so that the various elements of damage sustained by the Millers and 
their family could be resolved by Appraisal; and whereas by letter dated March 28, 1997, USAA 
selected Kenneth G. Riddle as its appraiser for the determination of the damage to the structure. 
The appraisal to be performed by Mr. Riddle, and possibly the umpire shall not 
include damages associated with fungi, impairment of health, loss of use, additional and/or 
temporary living expense, rental costs, hidden decay and any other damages. These elements of 
loss shall be determined by other appraisers, the Court or as the parties may hereafter determine. 
Mr. Riddle, ______ _ , and the unpi/e it needed, sfc ^e a separate appraisal 
>ss presuming the entire structure must be demolished. -^ d of as may possibly be 
*Jov , therefore: 
SELECTION OF THE MILLER'S APPRAISER 
The Miners hereb> seleu _ _ _ _ _ _ „ , * m " iiMiUiiisn IMI mlri ruination of the 
uiii.e to fhp structure. 
DATED this day of. __ 
Miller Kathryn Miller 
III. SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF UMPIRE 
USAA's appraiser, Kenneth G. Riddle, and the Millers' appraiser, , hereby 
select and appoint to act as umpire to settle matters of (difference that 
exist between the Millers and USAA in the determining the damage to the structure. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
IV. AMOUNT OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH DAMAGE TO STRUCTURE 
This amount of loss, shall be the amount necessary to repair or replace the damage to the 
Millers1 building caused by the broken water heater including damage to basement walls, ceiling 
floor, floor coverings and furnishings (limited as set forth above): 
A. If the two appraisers are able to agree on the amount of loss, they should write the 
agreed upon amount of loss in the following blank: $ and sign below: 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
B. If the two appraisers are unable to agree on the amount of loss, they will submit 
their differences to the umpire. Two of the three of the two appraisers and the umpire shall set 
the amount of loss, and shall write the amount of the loss in the following blank: 
$ . This shall be signed by all three, if all three agree to it, or by any two 
of the three that do agree to it in the space below: 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Umpire 
2 
000 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for I J'S A A 
ser for the M. 
The amount of loss determined above shall be reduced by the $500 deductible as set forth 
in the policy. The Award is, therefore, $ _ _ (the amount of loss set by the 
Appraisal, minus the $500 deductible). Again, this shall be signed by all three, if all three agree 
to it, or by any two of the three that do agree to it in the space below. 
Dated tins _ day of , L*. .. . _ _ _ 
jmpt iT 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
/ \ n n r a i c p r f n r rhp \ f i ! ! p r < ; 
*" AMOUNT OF LOSS IF TOTAL DEMOLITION NECESSARY 
The amount of loss shall be the loss sustained if the entire structure must be demolished 
and the debris property hauled away to an adequate and acceptable disposal site. 
A. If the two appraisers are able to agree on the amount of loss, thcv 
agreed upon amount of loss in the following blank: $ 
Dated this day oi , 1^97. 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
'nr ihe Miners 
B. if" [he iwo appraisers arc unable to agree on the amounfof loss, they will submit 
their differences to the umpire. Two of the three of the two appraisers and the umpire shall set 
(ill 04 7 
the amount of loss, and shall write the amount of the loss in the following blank: 
$ . This shall be signed by all three, if all three agree to it, or by any two 
of the three that do agree to it in the space below: 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Umpire 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
VII. AWARD IF TOTAL DEMOLITION NECESSARY 
The amount of loss determined above shall be reduced by the $500 deductible as set forth 
in the policy. The Award is, therefore, $ (the amount of loss set by the 
Appraisal, minus the $500 deductible). Again, this shall be signed by all three, if all three agree 
to it, or by any two of the three that do agree to it in the space below. 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
Umpire 
Kenneth G. Riddle 
Appraiser for USAA 
Appraiser for the Millers 
Agreement to Form: 
for USAA 
for the Millers 
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WILFORD M. BURTON 
BARRIE G. MCKAY 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN 
DAVID L. BIRD 
LYNN B. LARSEN* 
REID TATEOKA 
STEPHEN W. RU PP 
JOEL T. MARKER 
SCOTT C. PIERCE 
MONA LYMAN BURTONf 
HARRY CASTON 
ALLAN O. WALSH* 
BARBARA L. TOWNSENO 
GREGORY J. AOAMS 
JOHN O. MORRIS§ 
* ALSO AOMITTEO IN CALIFORNIA 
f ALSO AOMITTEO IN TEXAS 
$ ALSO ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA. 
VIRGINIA 6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
§ ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
Mi K A . L IURTON & T ' H U f " 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AT FORNEYS AND COUNSELORS A\ 
S U I T E 6 0 0 GATEWAY TOWER EAST 
IO EAST S O U T H T E M P L E STREET 
S A L T L A K E CITY; U T A H 8-4133 
(SOI) 5 2 1 - 4 1 3 5 
D A V I D L. MCKAY 
( 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 9 3 ) 
OF COUNSEL 
WILL IAM T T H U R M A N 
T E LE F" AX SO 1 5 2 I - 4 2 5 2 
I It:tubei' W 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
 M A R T I N E A U 
P. 0 . Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah. *• v * 
Re: Kathy Miller vs !T r w A 
II Ill i I ' '. 
Thank you for meeting with me yesterday morning. 
At that time you re-affirmed your rejection of the Appraisal form proposed by plaintiff, 
indicating that you had no intent to agree to any form which would give any credence to the 
theories of recovery alleged by plaintiffs. You further indicated that you would not agree to the 
form even if the statement were added that defendant was not in any way acknowledging or 
agreeing to the viability of the theories of recovery espoused by plaintiffs. 
i uu turther advised that you would not allow a reservation on the form you proposed 
indicating that the particular appraisal being performed did not cover all of the elenients of 
damage sought by plaintiff. 
My understanding of your objection . 
the credibility of plaintiffs or their claims. 
We then discussed backgrounds and philosophies of litigation. Interesting!) , v^e both 
expressed the same desire to bring this matter to a resolution in an expeditr^i^ *--^" -
•* -*x u ..ViLi ^ JUL mdicauru; vuv proposed method of resolution through 
M' . u ced be, other ADR methods, f am in he process of preparing such letter and 
*ir forward * u> \ou as soon as it is completed. 
. I I , I ,, ' " • . • v • -
EXHIBIT "3 
Robert H. Henderson 
October 28, 1997 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY Mill VU, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA PROPER IV \NIU VSI'.\ I I1. 
INSURANCE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE NO. 970500080 CY 
5th JUDICIAL D.'ST COURT " " ' > OOUNTv 
V ¥ t\, ~:l T,::: 
FE^  1 ': 1998 
- — '^f*^\zri^s 
_£r\ y' 
-TJTZrTJT 
^ cision in this case. 
That Decision was a denial of plaint _ _. - wm for Reinstatement - ..ontents of that 
Decision are hereby referenced ana incorporated in tins opmu !.. 
uiiii iiicu a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that ".this 
Court reverse it> previo;r- decision and reinstate this case. The defendant has opposed this 
most recent Motio I \\ t. itViMtih. vi I n I liereiiftn (hi I \\u\\ iiiiw denies plaintiffs' Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
r \ i x r \ J L , , s iS 
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this case seeking relief against defendant, their insurer, 
for breach of the insurance contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
I'laiiilills allege J 11 •. • I 11 •< i.lrlVinliiiii |>,nn II.MI I, • • l< <l In investigate and settle their claims in 
A. i . : - 6 
00085 
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a prompt and timely manner and, in so doing, had acted with malice in disregard for plaintiffs' 
health and rights. They sought damages against the defendant. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which this Court granted on August 21, 1997, as 
there had been no opposition filed by plaintiffs. The Motion had been pending for some 5 
months without response from the plaintiffs. The basis for the dismissal was a provision of the 
insurance contract which requires the parties to resolve differences as to the amount of a loss 
by resort to an appraisal process. That provision clearly sets out the procedure to be followed 
in selecting appraisers and an umpire to determine the loss amount. 
After the case had been dismissed, plaintiffs waited over 3 Vi months and then filed a 
Motion for Reinstatement, in which they alleged that the parties had not been able to agree 
how the appraisal clause of the insurance contract should be interpreted. They sought to have 
the Court vacate its order of dismissal. The Motion was denied by the Court because there 
had been no factual or legal showing that the judgment of dismissal should be set aside. 
Plaintiffs have now filed this Motion for Reconsideration, again requesting that this 
Court vacate and set aside its order of dismissal. In this Motion the plaintiffs assert that their 
Motion is proper under Rule 60(b)(7) URCP as there are reasons, not included in the first 6 
subparagraphs of Rule 60(b), which justify relief from the judgment of dismissal. The reason 
asserted is that the parties have not been able to agree as to the appropriate implementation of 
the appraisal clause. 
The suit which plaintiffs seek to resurrect has no claim relating to the interpretation of 
the appraisal clause. If there is a viable claim of that type, it may be grounds for a separate 
00083 
.3-
suit but it does not justify setting aside a disniLvvti ,au^i;x;. \ .; . 
Mm l ine uullmm i I 'illiiii iiiin i iinn I interpretation or implementation of the appraisal clause 
of the insurance conrract The judgment <*t dismissal stands, 
1
 , ; LD iin^ i -in lam .>; icDruai-, . i*&. 
CJ_<dtL 
i i i i i i •• i 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of February 1998, I mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
00036-
I / 
Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THITRMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IM Mil I II III hISTRII I ( IIIRTIN ANTf 
IROIN < ui IIN i Y, STAT 
I ' A l l I M M I I l<! a n . | K,\ I MS M M I I I' 
i" i 
Co 
JUR* 
^ 'S 
USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPAN Y, and 
kLNNETH RIDDLE, 
Det'endanls. 
Judge 
i. x tcuiiutis are residents oi iron Count}, Iui,.. iiic piopeii) at _ssu_ __i this dispute 
is located in Iron County, I Jtah. 
2. .in uSAA Proper!^  ' ana casualty Insurance Compar-v
 v ^wwiiou**.. 
Insurance Company"""1) is a corporation regulated under the Utah Insurance Code and doing 
h. 
\ ( i < | r n * l i n r ) 1 00012 
3. Kenneth Riddle ("Riddle") is an individual retained by Defendant Insurance 
Company to investigate the claim of Plaintiffs in Iron County, Utah. Defendant Insurance 
Company is liable and responsible for the actions of Riddle. 
4. The acts, events or transactions complained of either occurred in Iron County, Utah 
or arise out of events occurring in Iron County, Utah. The amount in controversy exceeds 
$20,000.00, exclusive of attorneys fees and costs. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. Prior to June 14, 1996, Plaintiffs purchased a policy of homeowner's insurance 
("Insurance") from Defendant Insurance Company insuring Plaintiffs' home at 694 West 200 
North, Parowan, Utah. 
6. On June 14, 1996, Plaintiffs suffered a sudden flood of water in the basement of 
their home located at 694 West 200 North in Parowan, Utah (the "Flood"). 
7. This Flood caused serious and permanent damage to the basement including the 
walls, floors and personal property present in the basement. 
8. Pursuant to the terms of the Insurance, Defendant Insurance Company was 
obligated to compensate Plaintiffs for the damage sustained to their home due to the Flood. 
9. Plaintiffs gave prompt and timely notice of the loss to Defendant Insurance 
Company . 
10. Plaintiffs have paid all insurance premiums in a timely manner. 
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16. Defendant Insurance Company's delay and refusal to compensate for the repair or 
removal of the unhealthy building material has exacerbated the problems and has added to the 
unsafe and unhealthy condition. As a result the property has been condemned and found to be 
uninhabitable. 
17. Further, to the extent within the limited means and ability of Plaintiffs, they have 
been forced into paying for their additional living expenses and to pay for expense for the repair 
of the home creating great and grave financial hardship on Plaintiffs. 
18. In addition the delay and failure of Defendants to investigate and of Defendant 
Insurance Company to settle this claim has caused Plaintiffs mental and emotional distress. In 
addition, Plaintiffs' home has become completely uninhabitable because of the molds, bacteria 
and spores which have developed because of the failure to pay for the repair or replacement of 
the damaged portion of the home. 
19. To seek compensation for their damages Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant 
Insurance Company, Civil No. 970500080 in this Court, seeking relief 
20. Defendant Insurance Company, in a now apparent scheme to delay or deny 
payment to Plaintiffs and in complete indifference to the rights, health and well-being of Plaintiffs 
and their family, moved to have the suit dismissed invoking the appraisal clause of the insurance 
policy. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. As a result, the Court, by Order of August 21, 
1997, did dismiss the action to allow the appraisal clause to be implemented. 
21. For several months, Plaintiffs sought to cooperate with Defendant in an effort to 
implement the appraisal clause. Defendant Insurance Company, however, refused to allow the 
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appraisal process to be implemented without severe restriction on the type of damage to be 
considered pursuant to the appraisal clause, again in the now apparent scheme to delay, deny and 
minimize the amounts to be paid Plaintiffs, in complete indifference to the rights, health and well-
being of Plaintiffs and their family. 
COUNT I; 
(DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY) 
22. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein paragraphs 1 to 21 above as if set forth 
in full herein. 
23. Plaintiffs request the Court to determine the appraisal clause has been waived by 
Defendant Insurance Company, or alternately, to determine how the appraisal clause should be 
interpreted and implemented without restricting or limiting the claim of Plaintiffs. 
24. Plaintiffs submit that if the appraisal clause is to be implemented, it must be done 
in a fair and equitable manner to allow all elements of Plaintiffs1 claims to be addressed. 
25. Defendant Insurance Company has refused to agree to any appraisal form which 
"would give any credence to the theories of recovery alleged by Plaintiffs". Defendant Insurance 
Company is further unwilling to "agree to the form even if the statement were added that 
Defendant Insurance Company was not in any way acknowledging or agreeing to the viability of 
the theories of recovery espoused by Plaintiffs". Defendant Insurance Company further advises 
that it "would not allow a reservation on the form . . . indicating that a particular appraisal being 
performed did not cover all the elements of damage sought by Plaintiffs". Defendant Insurance 
5 
0000$ 
Company further refuses to allow a series of appraisals so that all claims of Plaintiffs could be 
resolved. 
COUNT n; 
(BAD FAITH AGAINST DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY) 
26. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein paragraphs 1 to 25 above as if set forth 
in full herein. 
27. Defendant Insurance Company owed Plaintiffs a duty to investigate and settle the 
claim of Plaintiffs in a prompt and timely manner and to act in good faith and deal fairly with 
them. 
28. Defendant Insurance Company owed Plaintiffs a duty to implement the appraisal 
clause in good faith and in a fair manner. 
29. Defendant Insurance Company in bad faith has failed to meet the contractual duties 
and have sought instead to prevent even a consideration of Plaintiffs' claims. 
30. In addition, Defendant Insurance Company breached its duties to Plaintiffs by, 
among other things, 
a) failing to pay for a complete replacement of the water-damaged portion of 
the Plaintiffs' home and their water-damaged personal property; 
b) failing to promptly investigate and pay the claim; 
c) seeking to intimidate plaintiffs by making representations about recovery 
or the lack thereof; 
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31. Plaintiffs have been damaged by Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, 
but which includes medical costs resulting from being subjected to unnecessary mold and bacteria, 
loss of the use of their home, additional living expenses, trauma, emotional disorders, mental 
distress, inter alia. 
32. Defendant Insurance Company's actions were the result of willful and malicious, 
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 
COUNT IH; 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST DEFENDANT 
INSURANCE COMPANY) 
33. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein paragraphs 1 to 32 above as if set forth 
in full herein. 
34. Defendant Insurance Company's acts were the result of willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 
35. Defendant Insurance Company has breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and 
breached the terms of the Insurance by failing to pay for a complete replacement of the water-
damaged portion of Plaintiffs' home, failing to remove unsafe material, refusing to compensate 
Plaintiffs' for the Flood damage and water-damaged personal property. As a result, the residents 
had sustained physical damage have impaired health and have lost their home. 
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36. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Insurance Company's breaches of 
contract, Plaintiffs have been damaged as follows: 
a) mental and emotional distress; 
b) physical illness and distress; 
c) loss of use of their home; 
d) anger, frustration, and embarrassment; 
e) pecuniary loss for the repair and replacement of water-damaged property; 
f) costs for the secondary place of residence because of the uninhabitability 
of the home insured by Defendant Insurance Company; 
g) other special, general and consequential damages. 
37. Plaintiffs* injuries were directly and approximately caused by the breaches of 
contract of Defendant. 
COUNT IV: 
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BY 
DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY AND MR, RIDDLE) 
38. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein paragraphs 1 to 37 above as if set forth 
in full herein. 
39. Defendant Insurance company's refusal to pay insurance benefits has created severe 
mental and physical distress and discomfort on Plaintiffs. 
40. Defendant Insurance Company knew or should have known that its failure to pay 
benefits would cause severe distress by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have advised Defendants, and 
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Defendants are otherwise aware, of the condition of Plaintiffs' home, including the mold build-up 
and Defendants have done nothing more for them. 
41. Defendant Insurance Company was negligent in hiring, supervising, overseeing 
and/or monitoring the work of Riddle. 
42. Defendants' conduct is intolerable and outrageous and was done with implied or 
actual malice, reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' health and their rights. 
COUNT V: 
(AGAINST MR, RIDDLE AND DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY) 
43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein paragraphs 1 to 42 above as if set forth 
in full herein. 
44. Defendant Insurance Company retained Kenneth Riddle to perform a full and 
proper appraisal of the damage caused to Plaintiffs' residence. 
45. At the request of Defendant Insurance Company Plaintiffs attempted to cooperate 
with Mr. Riddle. The proper and complete inspection was intended to allow a full and complete 
payment to Plaintiffs for all damages sustained as a result of the flood of water as a mutual benefit 
to Plaintiffs and Defendant Insurance Company. 
46. Mr. Riddle breached his duty to Plaintiffs by failing to perform his appraisal in a 
just and professional manner and failing to report all damage to Defendant Insurance Company 
causing significant damage to Plaintiffs. 
47. Defendant Insurance Company is responsible for the actions of Riddle. 
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48. Mr. Riddle's acts were the result of willful and malicious, or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and 
a disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment against Defendants as 
follows: 
1. For special damages in an amount exceeding $90,000.00, to be proven at trial; 
2. For general damages in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact; 
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact; 
4. For pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and attorney's fees and for such other 
relief as may be just and equitable to the Court. 
5. For a declaration that the appraisal clause, if it is implemented, must be done in 
a fair and equitable way and allow for the just adjudication of all claims of Plaintiffs and for a 
declaration that Defendant has waived any right it may ever have had to invoke the appraisal 
clause. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 1998. 
Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs address: 
P. O. Box 1252 
Parowan, Utah 84761-1252 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\complain.2 
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Tab 8 
Stuart H. Schultz, #2886 
Peter H. Barlow, #7808 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/532-7080 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 980500124 
Judge: J. Philip Eves 
Defendants USAA Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA") and Kenneth Riddle move 
this Court to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, and V of plaintiff s Amended Complaint on the grounds 
that said claims are barred by this Court's order of dismissal of the same claims alleged 
previously by plaintiffs in an earlier, separate lawsuit. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, this motion is accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities which more fully sets forth the basis for this motion. 
1147 996 C0062 
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DATED this /f? day of July, 1998. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By: , 
/ Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the nJ day of July, 1998, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served, by mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
[jMM-J\h^y^^ 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNT I: 
Plaintiffs, : DECLARATORY RELIEF regarding the 
APPRAISAL CLAUSE 
vs. : 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE : Civil No. 980500124 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and : 
KENNETH RIDDLE, JUDGE J. Philip Eves 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, Paul and Kathryn Miller, move this Court to grant summary judgment on Count 
I of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Count I seeks declaratory relief that: 
1) Defendant USAA Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA") forfeited all rights 
under the "appraisal clause" of the policy by its refusal to allow the appraisal method to resolve 
all claims of plaintiffs; or alternatively, 
2) To declare "how the appraisal clause should be interpreted and implemented 
without restricting or limiting the claim of Plaintiffs." (Amended Complaint, ft 23 and 24) 
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Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, this Motion is accompanied 
by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, including a Statement of Facts, which more fully 
sets forth the basis for this Motion. 
Plaintiffs rely on this motion, the accompanying memorandum including the referenced 
Exhibits 1 through 27, the Affidavit of Kathryn Miller, and the file of Case No. 970500080, filed 
in this court in January/February of 1997. 
Plaintiffs request oral argument on this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | p day of August, 1998. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
1 
LynnB. Lars 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the JQ&A day of August, 1998, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, accompanying 
memorandum including exhibits, and Affidavit of Kathryn Miller was hand delivered to the 
following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI
 } 
9 Exchange Place #600 /} ,| , , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 By:(<7 K)C_ [u^L/ ft JL\ 
ls\lynn\miller\pldg.98\motion.psj 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : AFFIDAVIT OF KATHRYN MILLER in 
opposition of MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, and in support of MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
vs. : 
Civil No. 980500124 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and : JUDGE J. Philip Eves 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF ) 
I, Kathyrn Miller, the undersigned, having been duly sworn depose and state: 
I am one of the plaintiffs in this action. Prior to having to vacate our home, as explained 
below I, along with my family, resided at 694 West 200 North in Parowan, Utah. On behalf of 
J6flU-ilJf RH 11 37 
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Paul and myself and on behalf of my family, I was the one communicating with USAA and its 
representatives regarding the loss in and of our home and regarding obtaining recovery under our 
insurance with USAA. The following is based on my personal knowledge, and if called to do so, 
I would so testify under penalty of perjury to the following. 
1. We had a homeowner1 s insurance policy through defendant USAA Casualty 
Insurance Company ("USAA" or "insurance company") covering our residence at 694 West 200 
North, Parowan, Utah. 
2. We paid all insurance premiums and paid them in a timely manner 
3. On June 14, 1996 our hot water heater ruptured and with great force discharged 
water into areas of our residence. The water saturated the ceiling of the lower level of the house 
and several of the walls. 
4. Within hours of the incident, I notified defendant USAA of the problem. 
5. About 2 months later, Mr. Kenneth Riddle came to our home and told me that he 
had been sent by USAA to investigate the damage to our home. He, however, refused to examine 
the plumbing and electrical systems. He refused to examine the material within the walls which 
had been saturated. Mr. Riddle said that we were responsible for any damage inside the walls. 
6. After Mr. Riddle's visit, I had several conversations with USAA. USAA refused 
to pay for replacement of the walls and ceilings which had been saturated with water, or even to 
investigate the damage within the walls and ceiling, to the structure, or to the electrical and 
plumbing systems within the walls and ceiling. Several months later, USAA did send a check for 
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about $1300. This was significantly less that the $15,000 estimates we were receiving to perform 
the repair. 
7. Our only source of funds to repair our home was payment from the insurance 
company. We had no other means to pay for the replacement of the walls and ceiling which had 
been saturated with water. 
8. As a result of the lack of sufficient payment from USAA, the ceiling and walls which 
had been soaked were not replaced, nor were the hidden plumbing and electrical systems examined 
and repaired. 
9. The walls and ceiling dried out to some extent, but moisture remained and remains 
to this day, more than 2 years after the incident. As a direct result, our doctors say, bacteria and 
mold developed causing severe and unnecessary illness to me and my family. 
10. Because of the unhealthy condition of the home, and the resulting sicknesses we 
moved out of our house and relocated to a temporary residence. 
11. The policy of insurance between ourselves and USAA has a provision entitled 
"Additional Living Expense", which reads: 
"If a loss covered under Section -1 makes that part of the residence premises where 
you reside not fit to live in, we cover the necessary increase in living expenses 
incurred by you so that your household can maintain its normal standard of living." 
(See Provision D-l on page 3 of 18, Exhibit F) 
Nevertheless, USAA refused to pay for any of our extra living expenses. 
12. The County condemned our home as uninhabitable because of the mold, etc. which 
had flourished in the moist building material. 
3 
13. We were unable to pay for both the temporary residence and our vacated home. 
This together with the refusal of US A A to pay for the additional living expenses, lead to the 
foreclosure and loss of our home. 
14. Not used. 
15. We contacted several contractors for estimates. Each estimate was in the range of 
$15,000.00. 
16. We subsequently obtained an estimate in the amount of $12,200.00, which could 
not become final unless and until the sheet rock was all removed and a full inspection made of the 
areas behind the sheetrock. 
17. The inspecting contractor advised us: 
"In the course of my inspection I discovered numerous areas of 
sheetrock that had been totally saturated with water. In two 
different areas of the sheetrock I did a cut-out. The first area was 
in a joint, the tape had completely lifted from the mud base causing 
the tape to blister. The second area I cut out, the glue had 
completely dissolved leaving nothing to hold the paper and gypsum 
together. The ceilings were completely saturated and have started 
to pull through the fasteners. 
It is my professional opinion after being in the sheetrock trade for 
more than five years, that the sheetrock is not only damaged and 
needs to be replaced, but there are areas behind the sheetrock that 
need to be inspected and dried immediately. These areas pose a 
great risk to health and safety in my opinion to the occupants living 
in this dwelling." 
18. We and US A A could not agree on the cost to repair the damage. In fact, we could 
not even get US A A to examine the material that had been saturated within the walls. We told them 
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about our electrical problems in our basement that started after the ceilings and walls had been 
saturated. USAA refused to investigate. 
19. Therefore, we filed a lawsuit against USAA. 
20. Not used 
21. Not used. 
22. Not used. 
23. We attempted to resolve matters with USAA. We selected Mr. Kipp Smith to be 
our representative to appraise the damage to our house. We also selected Kurt Sparenberg as a 
alternate for Mr. Kipp Smith when Mr. Smith was not available. I informed USAA of our 
selection of Mr. Smith and Mr. Sparenberg. 
Date ( s e e qfwKgc/ \ 
Sworn and subscribed to before me this of 1998. 
Notary 
ls\lynn\miller\pldg.98\milleraff 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 1 
Plaintiffs, ( 
v. ( 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE i COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA ( 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and ( 
KENNETH RIDDLE, ( 
Defendants. 1 
[ ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND 
[ DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 980500124 
[ Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
This case came before the Court on November 16, 1998 for a hearing regarding 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss counts 2-5 of the Complaint, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Count 1 of the Complaint. Also before the court is Defendants' 
Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Notices to Submit 
were filed on October 28, 1998 regarding the Motion for Reconsideration, and on October 23, 
1998 regarding the Motion for a Protective Order. Defendants' Objection to the October 23 
notice has been satisfied with the Defendants' filing of a Reply Memorandum on October 29. 
The Court having heard oral argument, having reviewed the parties' Memoranda, 
affidavits and exhibits, and having reviewed relevant Utah law, now issues the following: 
Addendum 11 
nr 
ORDER 
The doctrine of res judicata is clearly applicable to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
Counts 2-5 of the Complaint — relating to accusations of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages — are effectively the same as 
both counts of Plaintiffs original suit (civ. no. 970500080) dealing with breach of contract 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dismissal in that case constituted a final 
judgement on the merits. As such, the parties may not again raise those issues in this law suit, 
or raise other issues in this law suit which should have been raised in the original suit. State 
ex. rel. T.L v. State, 945 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1997). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
granted in full. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) allows the Court to reconsider the ruling of a previous motion 
any time prior to a final decision in the case. Allowing ongoing litigation while appraisal is 
occurring as set forth in the Court's Declaratory Judgment below would undermine and 
interfere with the appraisal process, resulting in manifest injustice. For this reason, 
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider is granted and the Court hereby orders that all discovery 
relating to the above dismissed claims cease.1 
Relating to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated 
that providing the identity of every insurance carrier for whom Defendant Riddle has 
performed work during 1995-1998 and the number of properties investigated for each of those 
companies (in compliance with Interrogatory No. 6) is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
aThis order does not affect the right of the appraisers and umpire to themselves obtain 
or order the discovery of any relevant information from either party relating to loss suffered by 
Plaintiffs, defined in its broadest sense, as set forth below in the Court's Declaratory 
Judgement. 
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discovery of admissible evidence, or that it is in any way relevant to the subject matter of this 
action. Moreover, such interference with Mr. Riddle's customers must not be allowed as a 
breach of confidential commercial information. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is 
granted. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 of the 
Complaint, the motion is hereby denied in the first part and granted in the second part, and the 
Court declares and adjudges as follows: 
Plaintiffs in no way demonstrate that Defendants have forfeited their right to appraisal, 
and the Court finds no reason to declare that the appraisal process may not be used as ordered 
in the previous action. Alternatively the court does see fit to declare how the appraisal clause 
should be interpreted regarding the scope of the appraisers and umpire to hear and resolve 
disputes. 
In its entirety the appraisal clause, found on page 12 of the Homeowner's Policy, reads 
as follows: 
If you and we do not agree on the amount of loss, either party can demand that the amount 
of the loss be determined by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for appraisal, each will 
select a competent, independent appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser's identity within 20 
days of receipt of the written demand. 
The two appraisers will then select a competent, impartial umpire. If the two appraisers 
are not able to agree upon the umpire within 15 days, you and we can ask a judge of a court of 
record in the state where the residence premises is located to select an umpire. 
The appraisers will then set the amount of loss. If they submit a written report of any 
agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail to agree within a 
reasonable time, they will submit their differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by any 
two of these three will set the amount of the loss. Each appraiser will be paid by the party selecting 
that appraiser. Other expenses of the appraiser and the compensation of the umpire will be 
equally paid by you and us. 
Utah Law favors the use of alternative means of dispute resolution. Arbitration clauses, such as the 
appraisal clause contained in Policy used by the parties, are looked upon generously by Utah lawmakers as 
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a means of cutting down on litigation, and promoting judicial economy. Sfi£ Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-3. 
For that reason, courts in Utah tend to encourage the use of such arbitration clauses in insurance policies, 
"reflecting long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes." 
Sfifi Allred v. Educators Mutual Ins. Asc'n.of Utahr 909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1996). There is litde doubt that 
Judge Eves, in the previous action, dismissed the entire claim in keeping with this public policy principle. 
Likewise, in keeping with this principle of public policy, the Court hereby declares and adjudges that the 
appraisal clause be construed to allow the appraisers and the umpire to consider all losses claimed by the 
Plaintiffs resulting from the 1996 water heater burst which flooded Plaintiffs' home. Furthermore, the 
court declares that assessment of such loss shall include all damages suffered by Plaintiffs from the broken 
water heater in the most general sense, including but not limited to actual losses, expenses, decrease in 
value or resources or increase in liabilities, depletion or depreciation or destruction of value, deprivation, 
ruin, shrinkage in value of estate or property, or any other loss stemming from the water heater burst 
which the appraisers and umpire, in their discretion, decide to consider. Sfifi Black's Law Dictionary 945 
(6th ed. 1990). The Homeowner's Policy, which does not itself define the term "loss" and which places no 
limits on the type of losses to be considered by the appraisers and umpire, may reasonably be read to 
support such a definition of loss. Furthermore, it is entirely proper that the appraisal clause be so 
construed against USAA casualty, its drafter. 
The Court further directs that in keeping with the appraisal clause, both pjiries must 
"select a competent, independent appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser's identity 
within 20 days" of the issuing of this judgment. The court further adjudges that Defendant 
Kenneth Riddle is now a party to this lawsuit, he can no longer be construed as zin 
"independent appraiser" within the meaning of the appraisal clause, and directs that Defendant 
USAA Casualty must appoint some other competent appraiser. Plaintiffs have never appointed 
an appraiser. They have merely objected to defendant's actions instead. That is not an option 
for plaintiffs. If either party fails to appoint an appraiser within the stated 20 days, that party 
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may be subject to sanctions by the court, including assessment of casts and fees. Also, if the 
two appraisers are unable to agree upon an umpire 15 days thereafter, in keeping with the 
appraisal clause the parties must immediately petition this court for the purpose of selecting an 
umpire. Once the appraisers and umpire are selected, the appraisal process shall take place in 
a timely and efficient manner. 
Finally, the Court directs that after the appraisers and umpire have made a final 
calculation of loss, then and only then may their decision be appealed to this court for 
modification — but only within 20 days of the decision. The standard of modification shall be 
based upon "evident mistake" or "evident miscalculation.n See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15. 
The appraisers and the umpire shall be given broad discretion and general deference in their 
decision making ability. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and counts 2-
5 of the Complaint are hereby ordered dismissed as a final judgment on the merits. Likewise, 
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Reconsideration are also granted. 
Finally, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 is denied in part and 
granted in part, and the parties are ordered to comply with the terms of appraisal set forth in 
the Court's Declaratory Judgment, above. 
Dated this £ > Q 4ay of November, 1998. 
ROBERT T. ^RAITHWAITE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this J^> day of November, 1998 I provided true and 
correct copies of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in the United States 
Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
9 Exchange Place #600 
SLCUT 84111 
Lynn B. Larsen 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 E South Temple 
SLC UT 84133 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801)521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT (CLARIFICATION 
Plaintiffs, AND/OR CONFIRMATION) 
vs. : 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE : Civil No. 980500124 
COMPANY (sometimes known as 
USAA Property and Casualty Insurance : Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Co.), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs Paul and 
Kathryn Miller, through counsel, hereby move the Court to alter or amend the ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT dated November 25, 1998 to confirm that 
the appraisers "in their discretion" may consider damages and losses associated with bad faith, 
mental and emotional distress, illness, injury, and punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs have sought, but not been able, to obtain the agreement of USAA that the 
appraiser may award these types of damages. 
00993 
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Plaintiffs intend to appoint their appraiser on or before the 20th day, December 15, 
1998 and expect defendant USAA to do the same, as required by the ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of December, 1998. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
.ynn 6. Larseh 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 7th day of December, 1998, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
(CLARIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION) was faxed and sent by first class mail to the 
following: 
Stuart H. Schultz (596-1508) 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Byr^ TV )&CJUP/J.J?ASJ 
ls\lynn\miller\pldg.98\mot2amd.jdg 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801)521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
Plaintiffs, : JUDGMENT (CLARIFICATION 
AND/OR CONFIRMATION) 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, through counsel, file this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment; that is, to obtain clarification and/or confirmation. 
In February of 1997, plaintiffs filed an action in this Court, Case No. 970500080 wherein 
plaintiffs sought relief for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
including a claim that has been interpreted to be a claim of bad faith against defendant USAA 
Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA"). Plaintiffs sought recovery for damages for mental and 
emotional distress, physical illness and distress, loss of use of their home, anger, frustration, and 
embarrassment, pecuniary loss for the repair and replacement water-damaged property, other 
special, general and consequential damages, severe mental and physical distress, and punitive 
damages. (See Exhibit 1) 
01018 
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Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
That action was dismissed pursuant to the Court finding "that the parties are bound by 
contract to settle the dispute in this case by appraisal". (See Exhibit 2) 
Thereafter, the parties had difficulty in implementing the appraisal pursuant to the Court 
order (Exhibit 2). As a result, plaintiffs filed a second action, Case No. 980500124 in which 
plaintiff sought declaratory relief against USAA as well as recovery of damages (Exhibit 3). 
Following counter-motions from the parties and a hearing before the Court on November 
16, 1998, the Court issues its ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
(Exhibit 4) wherein the Court found, among other things, 
—that the second action was barred pursuant to res judicata finding that the "Counts II-V 
of the Complaint [Exhibit 3] —relating to accusations of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages—are effectively the same as both 
counts of plaintiffs original suit (civ. no. 970500080) dealing with breach of contract and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Exhibit 4, page 2, paragraph 1) 
—the parties are to use the appraisal process to resolve all their disputes, pursuant to the 
prior order (Exhibit 4, page 3, paragraph 3); and 
"the appraisers and the umpire fare] to consider all losses claimed by the plaintiffs 
resulting from the 1996 water heater burst which flooded plaintiffs' home. Furthermore, the court 
declares that assessment of such loss shall include all damages suffered by Plaintiffs from the 
broken water heater in the most general sense, including but not limited to actual losses, expenses, 
decrease in value or resources or increase in liabilities, depletion or depreciation or destruction 
of value, deprivation, ruin, shrinkage in value of estate or property, or any other loss stemming 
from the water heater burst which the appraisers and umpire, in their decision, decide to consider. 
See Black's Law Dictionary 945 (6th Ed. 1990). The Homeowner's Policy, which does not itself 
define the term "loss" and which places no limits on the type of losses to be considered by the 
01ui7 
appraisers and umpire, may reasonably be read to support such a definition of loss. Furthermore, 
it is entirely proper that the appraisal clause be so construed against USAA casualty, its drafter." 
(original emphasis) (Exhibit 4, page 4, first paragraph) 
The plaintiffs seek confirmation that "loss" and "all damages" as used in the ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (Exhibit 4) include damages for bad faith, 
injury, illness, mental and emotional distress, physical distress and punitive damages "which the 
appraisers and umpire, in their discretion, decide to consider." (Exhibit 4, page 4, first 
paragraph) 
Plaintiffs wish the clarification to avoid any further misunderstanding between plaintiffs 
and defendant USAA. Plaintiffs have sought but have been unable to obtain confirmation from 
defendant USAA to the scope of the appraiser's discretion. 
Plaintiffs appreciate the Court's patience in again giving attention to this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of December, 1998. 
McKA,Y, BURTON & THURMAN 
'Lyrrn B. carsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
01016 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 7th day of December, 1998, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT (CLARIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION) was faxed and sent by first class 
mail to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz (596-1508) 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By:<^S-^J^^^J^l, 
ls\ly nn\miller\pldg. 98\mem2amd .jdg 
010i5 
Omitted Exhibits to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend or Alter 
(Clarification and/or Confirmation) 
1. Complaint in Miller I. (Add. 2) 
2. August 21, 1997 order in Miller I (Add. 4) 
3. Complaint in Miller II (Add.7) 
4. November 25, 1998 order in Miller II (Add. 11) 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and 
KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
(Clarification and/or Confirmation), filed December 8, 1998. Defendants filed their Memorandum 
in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Clarification and/or Confirmation) 
on December 24, 1998. The Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment (Clarification and/or Confirmation) was then filed on December 30, 1998, along 
with a Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda and exhibits, the Court now enters the following 
Order: 
A AA^t^A\ irr» 1 A 
01073 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Clarification and/or Confirmation) is 
denied. At this juncture, the Court wishes to bolster the authority of the appraisers and umpire, 
not to undermine it. The Court's Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, dated November 
25, 1998, was intended to extend to the appraisers and the umpire the discretion to determine 
which damages or claims would be appraised. The Court refuses now to take away that 
authority. After the calculation of loss is made by the appraisers and umpire, and not until that 
point, if either party is of the view that the calculation of loss was made in error, an appeal may 
be made to this court as provided under the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-1, et 
seq. But at this point and time, the Court has made its ruling, and it is premature to involve the 
court before the appraisers and umpire have had the opportunity to perform their duties. 
The Court notes that this is the second time the plaintiffs have attempted to l 'pre-empt" 
the appraisal process. Defendants are therefore granted reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to Plaintiffs' motion. Plaintiffs are to submit proof by affidavit as to those fees. 
Dated this day of January, 1999. 
~7^^fc> 
ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
01072 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this ///) day of January, 19991 provided true and correct copies of the 
foregoing ORDER OF DENIAL to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Lynn B. Larsen 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 E South Temple St. 
SLC UT 84133 
Stuart Schultz & Peter Barlow 
9 Exchange Place #600 
SLC UT 84111 
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Tab 14 
Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR CONFERENCE 
(Including Memorandum) 
Civil Nov$70500080 CV 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs, Paul and Kathryn Miller, through counsel, hereby request a conference with the 
court pursuant to Rule 16 to confer on the forum and schedule for resolving the remaining claims 
of plaintiffs. 
Pursuant to the court orders of August 21, 1997 in Case No. 970500080 CV and of 
November 25, 1998 in Case No. 980500124, the parties selected appraisers and, with the 
assistance of the court-appointed umpire, the panel issued a LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD. 
A true and correct copy of the award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Therein the panel 
explains that it exercised its discretion pursuant to the court order of November 25, 1998 and 
Addendum 14 00101 
chose "to only appraise property damages within the limits of the policy." The panel explained 
that it was reluctant to analyze the other claims. The appraisal report submitted by plaintiffs' 
appointed appraiser included appraisals of all claims. The panel stated: 
"The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual 
claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless 
specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on die laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, 
and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' 
claims heard by one body or another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any 
procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly brought claims. 
The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of 
another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court 
Order and has chosen to only appraise property damage within the limits of the 
policy. The panel hereby defers any and all claims, damages, and losses, including 
but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate 
that the extra-contractual claims be determined through a court trial process, rather 
than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or decide issues 
or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy." 
As such, plaintiff respectfully requests a conference to allow the parties to confer with the court 
and receive direction on the forum and scheduling by which the "extra-contractual claims" will 
be resolved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of December, 1999. 
McKAY, BURTOW& THURMAN 
jUfnriB. Larsfefi 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23rd day of December, 1999, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Conference (including Memorandum) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ls\Jbl\millcr\pldg\pldg.98\requcst 4 conference 
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Re: USAA MEMBER: 
USAA NUMBER: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
LOSS LOCATION: 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
PAUL & KATHY MILLER 
10881638 
6-24-96 
PAROWAN, UTAH 
We, the appraisal panel in the above-referenced matter have met and conferred on this set of claims, and jointly 
submit this Limited Appraisal Award: 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive 
damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' claims heard by one body or 
another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court Order and has chosen to only 
appraise property damage within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all other claims, damages and 
losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual 
claims be determined through a court trail process, rather than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy. 
WHEREFORE, we make the following limited award: 
Real Property Damage: $32,500 
Loss of Use of Real Property: 5,880 
Personal Property: 2,500 
AWARD: $40,880 
Executed this 17th day of December, 1999 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The^Honorable Jam<^Sawaya 
Surt-Appointed Umpire 
""Edward H. Cross, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insureds 
Steve Love, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insurer 
"A' 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR CONFERENCE 
(Including Memorandum) 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
Civil Noi/980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs, Paul and Kathryn Miller, through counsel, hereby request a conference with the 
court pursuant to Rule 16 to confer on the forum and schedule for resolving the remaining claims 
of plaintiffs. 
Pursuant to the court orders of August 21, 1997 in Case No. 970500080 CV and of 
November 25, 1998 in Case No. 980500124, the parties selected appraisers and, with the 
assistance of the court-appointed umpire, the panel issued a LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD. 
A true and correct copy of the award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Therein the panel 
explains that it exercised its discretion pursuant to the court order of November 25, 1998 and 
UiilT 
chose "to only appraise property damages within the limits of the policy." The panel explained 
that it was reluctant to analyze the other claims. The appraisal report submitted by plaintiffs' 
appointed appraiser included appraisals of all claims. The panel stated: 
"The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual 
claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless 
specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, 
and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' 
claims heard by one body or another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any 
procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly brought claims. 
The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of 
another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court 
Order and has chosen to only appraise property damage within the limits of the 
policy. The panel hereby defers any and all claims, damages, and losses, including 
but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate 
that the extra-contractual claims be determined through a court trial process, rather 
than an appraisal process. Therefore, the panel did not address or decide issues 
or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy." 
As such, plaintiff respectfully requests a conference to allow the parties to confer with the court 
and receive direction on the forum and scheduling by which the "extra-contractual claims" will 
be resolved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of December, 1999. 
McKAJf, BURTONf& THURMAN 
jLJnvlB. Lar^ eii 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23rd day of December, 1999, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Conference (including Memorandum) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to die following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By: <S/.ysdvyaoij^ 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg.98\request 4 conference 
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Re: USAA MEMBER: 
USAA NUMBER: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
LOSS LOCATION: 
LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
PAUL & KATHY MILLER 
10881638 
6-24-96 
PAROWAN, UTAH 
We, the appraisal panel in the above-referenced matter have met and conferred on this set of claims, and jointly 
submit this Limited Appraisal Award: 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive 
damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' claims hsard by one body or 
another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court Order and has chosen to only 
appraise property damage within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all other claims, damages and 
losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual 
claims be determined through a court trail process, rather than an appraisal process. Therefore, the paiel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy. 
WHEREFORE, we make the following limited award: 
Real Property Damage: $32,500 
Loss of Use of Real Property: 5,880 
Personal Property: 2,500 
AWARD: $40,880 
Executed this 17th day of December, 1999 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Th&Honorable Jamea^Sawaya 
Suit-Appointed Umpire 
Edward H. Cross, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insureds 
Steve Love, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insurer 
"A' 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as 
USAA Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL 
AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT 
TRIAL ON "EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL 
CLAIMS (E.G., BAD FAITH, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS, ETC.)" AND "ANY AND 
ALL OTHER CLAIMS, DAMAGES 
AND LOSSES ... " OF THE 
MILLERS' BEYOND "PROPERTY 
DAMAGE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
THE POLICY" AS REFERENCED IN 
THE LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs, through counsel, pursuant to Utah Code section 78-3la-12 hereby move the 
court to confirm the LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD issued by the panel of appraisers and 
Addendum 15 00104 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FEFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
mON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as 
USAA Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL 
AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT 
TRIAL ON "EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL 
CLAIMS (E.G., BAD FAITH, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS, ETC.)" AND "ANY AND 
ALL OTHER CLAIMS, DAMAGES 
AND LOSSES ... " OF THE 
MILLERS' BEYOND "PROPERTY 
DAMAGE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
THE POLICY" AS REFERENCED IN 
THE LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs, through counsel, pursuant to Utah Code section 78-3 la-12 hereby move the 
court to confirm the LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD issued by the panel of appraisers and 
01197 
umpire on December 17, 1999, and to schedule a trial on the remaining unresolved claims of 
Plaintiffs, i.e. those beyond the claim for "property damage within the limits of the policy." 
(Exhibit A) This includes breach of contract and tort claims, as well as claims for bad faith and 
punitive damages. The panel of appraisers and umpire only determined the property damage 
claim within "the express terms of the insurance policy/' finding that the remaining claims were 
more appropriately determined in a court trial. (Exhibit A) Plaintiffs request that the court allow a 
period to complete discovery. 
Pursuant to the court orders of August 21, 1997 in Case No. 970500080 CV and of 
November 25, 1998 in Case No. 980500124, the parties selected appraisers, and the court 
appointed an umpire. The panel of appraisers and umpire conferred and issued a LIMITED 
APPRAISAL AWARD. A copy of the award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by reference. The panel exercised the discretion given it by the court and chose "to only 
appraise property damages within the limits of the policy," and awarded plaintiffs $40,880. 
(Exhibit A) The panel explained: 
"The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-
contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive damages, emotional distress, etc.) 
unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is 
generally hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-
contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having 
Plaintiffs' claims heard by one body or another. It is the intent of this panel to 
follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action 
by decision of another tribunal. 
2 
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In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to 
Court Order and has chosen to only appraise property damage within the 
limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all claims, damages, 
and losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We 
believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual claims be determined 
through a court trial process, rather than an appraisal process. Therefore, the 
panel did not address or decide issues or determine losses beyond the express 
terms of the insurance policy." 
(Exhibit A, bold added) 
Plaintiffs move the court to confirm the LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD and to 
schedule a trial on the remaining claims of Plaintiffs, as set forth in the LIMITED APPRAISAL 
AWARD. 
Plaintiffs also request an award of attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs rely on the accompanying Memorandum and the court files in Civil No. 
970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124 CN in support of this Motion. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 2000. 
McKAY. BURTON & THURMAN 
JM~ 
Lynn B. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
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CERTDJICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 14th day of January, 2000, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
and TO SCHEDULE COURT TRIAL ON "EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS (E.G., 
BAD FAITH, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, ETC.)" AND "ANY 
AND ALL OTHER CLAIMS, DAMAGES AND LOSSES ... " OF THE MILLERS' 
BEYOND "PROPERTY DAMAGE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE POLICY" AS 
REFERENCED IN THE LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bv. oC. ^CIOY^JUULU^ 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg.98\mot.confirm 
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LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD 
Re: USAA MEMBER: 
USAA NUMBER: 
DATE OF LOSS: 
LOSS LOCATION: 
PAUL & KATHY MILLER 
10881638 
6-24-96 
PAROWAN, UTAH 
COWf 
We, the appraisal panel in the above-referenced matter have met and conferred on this set of claims, and jointly 
submit this Limited Appraisal Award: 
The panel as a whole is neither prepared nor willing to address extra-contractual claims (e.g., bad faith, punitive 
damages, emotional distress, etc.) unless specifically directed by the Court to do so. The panel as a whole is generally 
hesitant to embark on the laborious task of analyzing the extra-contractual claims, and feels unqualified to do so. 
However, the panel agrees that the Defendants cannot avoid having Plaintiffs' claims heard by one body or 
another. It is the intent of this panel to follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly 
brought claims. The panel will take any action to preserve those causes of action by decision of another tribunal. 
In light of the foregoing, the panel has exercised its discretion pursuant to Court Order and has chosen to only 
appraise property damage within the limits of the policy. The panel hereby defers any and all other claims, damages and 
losses, including but not limited to any extra-contractual claims. We believe it more appropriate that the extra-contractual 
claims be determined through a court trail process, rather than an appraisal-process. Therefore, the panel did not address or 
decide issues or determine losses beyond the express terms of the insurance policy. 
WHEREFORE, we make the following limited award: 
Real Property Damage: $32,500 
Loss of Use of Real Property: 
Personal Property: 
5,880 
2,500 
AWARD: $40,880 
Executed this 17th day of December, 1999 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Th^Honorable Jam^Sawaya 
Suirt-Appointed Umpire 
^Edward H. Cross, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insureds 
Steve Love, Esq. 
Appraiser Appointed by Insurer 
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Stuart H. Schultz, #2886 
Peter H. Barlow, #7808 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/532-7080 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs ] 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA ] 
Property and Casualty Insurance Co.), and ) 
KENNETH RIDDLE, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION FOR CONFERENCE AND 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CONFIRM 
) LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD AND 
) TO SCHEDULE TRIAL 
> Case No. 980500124 
i Judge: Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs submitted a "Motion For Conference (Including Memorandum") on December 
23, 1999 and a Motion to Confirm Limited Appraisal Award and to Schedule Court Trial on 
Extra-Contractual Claims on January 14, 2000. 
Plaintiffs have submitted their memoranda in support of their motions, and defendants 
have submitted responsive memoranda to plaintiffs' motions . 
The court, having considered plaintiffs' motions, together with the memoranda in support 
1147 996 
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and in opposition to the motions, and being fully advised in the premises, now, therefore; 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, RULES, AND HOLDS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. This lawsuit arises out of a single event the bursting of a water heater on or 
about June 14, 1996, in the plaintiffs' home iocated in Parowan, Utah. 
2. The plaintiffs' home was insured by defendant USAA Casualty Insurance 
Company (USAA). 
3. The plaintiffs made a claim for water damage to their basement as a result of the 
water heater bursting. 
4. A dispute arose between USAA and the plaintiffs regarding the damage caused to 
plaintiffs' home and property as a result of the water heater bursting. 
5. As a consequence of the dispute, plaintiffs filed their first lawsuit on or about 
January 17, 1997, against USAA (Miller D. Miller I included causes of action for breach of 
contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sought medical expenses, general 
damages and punitive damages. See Complaint in Miller L Civil No. 970500080. 
6. Miller I and all its claims were dismissed on August 21, 1997, by order of the 
Honorable Phillip Eves, District Judge. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to reinstate the claims 
alleged in Miller L which motion was denied by Judge Eves. Plaintiffs thereafter moved for 
reconsideration of that denial, which motion Judge Eves also denied. 
7. Plaintiffs took no appeal from the order of dismissal or the subsequent orders 
1147.996 - 2 -
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denying reinstatement and denying reconsideration in Miller I. 
8. On or about February 25, 1998, plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit against USAA and 
Kenneth Riddle, in which they alleged claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, first 
party bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sought special and general 
damages, as well as punitive damages. See Counts 2-5 of plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil No. 
980500124 (hereinafterMillern). 
9. Defendants moved to dismiss Counts 2-5 of the Complaint in Miller II on the 
grounds ofres judicata. This court heard defendants' motion to dismiss in November 1998 and 
entered its order of dismissal on November 25, 1998, holding, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The doctrine of res judicata is clearly applicable to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Counts 2-5 of the Complaint - -
relating to accusations of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages - -
are effectively the same as both counts of Plaintiffs' original suit 
(civ. no. 970500080) dealing with breach of contract and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dismissal in that case 
constituted a final judgment on the merits. As such, the parties may 
not again raise those issues in this lawsuit, or raise other issues in 
this lawsuit which should have been raised in the original suit. State 
ex. rel. T.J, v. State, 945 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1997). 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in full. 
* * * * 
On the basis of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss is granted, and Counts 2-5 of the Complaint are hereby 
ordered dismissed as a final judgment on the merits. 
11/25/98 Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment. 
1147.996 -3- C U 4 : 
10. Count 1 of the Complaint in Miller II sought a declaratory judgment interpreting 
the appraisal clause contained in the homeowners policy of insurance issued by USAA to the 
plaintiffs. 
11. The court rendered a declaratory judgment as part of its November 25, 1998 Order 
and Declaratory Judgment, wherein the court declared that the insurance policy's appraisal 
provision should be implemented and that plaintiffs' claims under the terms of the policy were to 
be referred for appraisal with each party appointing their own appraiser and an umpire also being 
appointed either as agreed upon by the parties or by order of the court. Pursuant to Ihe 
declaratory judgment, this court gave the appraisers and the umpire the discretion to determine 
what amount of award the Millers were entitled to under the terms of the policy as a consequence 
of the bursting of the water heater. 
12. A further order was entered by the court on January 22 1999, in which the court 
denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the November 25, 1998, Order and Declaratory 
Judgment. The court refused to order, as requested by the plaintiffs, that the appraisers and the 
umpire were required to render an award and decision with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for bad 
faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, personal injury, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
punitive damages. The court instead ruled that the appraisers and umpire had been given 
discretion to determine the loss and specifically "to determine which damages or claims would be 
appraised." After that discretion had been exercised, the parties could appeal the appraisers' and 
1147.996 -4- C 1 J 4 0 
umpire's award to the court. 
13. On December 17, 1999, the appraisers and umpire issued a limited appraisal award 
setting the amount of loss for property damages to the Millers at $40,880.00. On that same date 
the Millers, through counsel, demanded that USAA pay the award before December 25, 1999. 
USAA delivered payment of the full amount of the award on December 22, 1999, the payment 
and receipt of which was acknowledged in writing by the Millers, through their counsel. The 
Millers did not appeal the amount of the awarded loss to this court. 
14. In the limited appraisal award, the umpire and appraisers comment that they 
believe the plaintiffs are entitled to have their day in court, so to speak, with respect to all claims 
that have been properly brought, but which were not included as part of the appraisal award. 
According to the plaintiffs' Motions, this would include their claims for bad faith, breach of 
fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, for personal injury damages, and for 
punitive damages. In other words, the same claims which were dismissed as a final judgment on 
the merits in Miller I. from which plaintiffs took no appeal, and the same Counts 2-5 which were 
dismissed by this court as a final judgment on the merits on the grounds of res judicata in the 
Order and Declaratory Judgment of November 25, 1998. 
15. The appraisers and umpire were not empowered by this court to set aside orders of 
dismissal and final judgments on the merits. The appraisers and umpire were only empowered and 
given discretion to decide what would be appraised and to make an award for the loss caused by 
1147.996 -5-
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the bursting water heater. This the appraisers have done, and it would be in excess of any 
jurisdiction granted by this court to them for this court to allow the setting aside of the final 
judgments on the merits on the basis of comments included in the limited appraisal award. 
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to pursue causes of action which have now been dismissed two 
separate times as final judgments on the merits and from which final judgments the plaintiffs have 
taken no appeal, is for this court to decide. 
Based on the foregoing findings, holdings and rulings, and good cause appealing, now, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm is denied on the grounds that the loss awarded 
has been paid in full and there is no reason to affirm it and enter a judgment on the same; 
2. The plaintiffs' Motion to Set a Trial Date on Counts 2-5 of the Complaint in Miller 
fl is denied on the grounds that Counts 2-5 have previously been dismissed on the grounds of res 
judicata as a final judgment on the merits, because the same claims had previously been dismissed 
as a final judgment on the merits in Miller I from which plaintiffs took no appeal, nor did they 
appeal the limited appraisal award to this court, but rather simply demanded that the amount be 
paid immediately, which has been done in full; 
3. Even accepting the appraisers' comments that the plaintiffs should be allowed their 
1147 996 -6-
day in court on all claims properly brought, the claims comprising Counts 2-5 of the plaintiffs' 
complaint in Miller II are not properly before this court, as they have previously been dismissed 
both in Miller I and again in Miller II as final judgments on the merits. The appraisers and umpire 
having performed their duties and exercised their discretion, and made an award for damages 
found to be a loss covered under the policy, this matter is now concluded and there are no 
pending claims to be further considered; 
4. Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees is denied; and 
5. Plaintiffs Motion for Conference is denied as the matter is moot for the reasons 
set forth above. 
DATED this /(/ day of f//&lC'/^ 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
Hon. Robert T. Braithwaite 
District Court Judge 
1147 996 -7- 01338 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *<iav of February, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was served to the following: 
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
1148 996 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTV, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiffs, : 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
vs. : Civil No. 980500124 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE : 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Property and Casualty Insurance : 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that plaintiffs Paul Miller and Kathryn Miller, through 
counsel, McKay, Burton & Thurman and in particular Lynn B. Larsen, appeal to the LTtah 
Supreme Court the final judgment entered on March 10, 2000 denying PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT TRIAL filed in 
Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124 and PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CONFERENCE filed in Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124. 
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This appeal is taken from the entire order issued in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2000. 
McKAYZ BURTON: & THURMAN 
B. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of March, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg.98\Notice of Appeal 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiffs, : 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
vs. : Civil No. 980500124 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE : 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Property and Casualty Insurance : 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that plaintiffs Paul Miller and Kathryn Miller, through 
counsel, McKay, Burton & Thurman and in particular Lynn B. Larsen, appeal to the LTtah 
Supreme Court the final judgment entered on March 10, 2000 denying PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT TRIAL filed in 
Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124 and PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CONFERENCE filed in Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124. 
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This appeal is taken from the entire order issued in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2000. 
McKAY2 BURTON & THURMAN 
B. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of March, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg 98\Notice of Appeal 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that plaintiffs Paul Miller and Kathryn Miller, through 
counsel, McKay, Burton & Thurman and in particular Lynn B. Larsen, appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court the final judgment entered on March 10, 2000 denying PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT TRIAL filed in 
Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124 and PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CONFERENCE filed in Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124, the interlocutory 
order of January 22, 1999 denying Appellants' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
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(CLARIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION) filed in Civil No. 980500124, and that portion 
of the interlocutory order of November 25, 1998 granting Appellees' MOTION TO DISMISS 
filed in Civil No. 980500124. 
This appeal is taken from the entire order of March 10, 2000, the entire order of January 
22, 1999 and of that portion of the November 25, 1998 order dismissing counts 2 - 5 of the 
Complaint in case no. 980500124 all issued in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, 
State of Utah. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2000. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
J. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 22nd day of March, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 ^ n """ 
Bv: <*P. Jio/UuUjL^ , 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg.98\Notice of Appeal 
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Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY (sometimes known as USAA 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company), and KENNETH RIDDLE, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 970500080 CV 
Civil No. 980500124 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that plaintiffs Paul Miller and Kathryn Miller, through 
counsel, McKay, Burton & Thurman and in particular Lynn B. Larsen, appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court the final judgment entered on March 10, 2000 denying PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO CONFIRM LIMITED APPRAISAL AWARD and TO SCHEDULE COURT TRIAL filed in 
Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124 and PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CONFERENCE filed in Civil No. 970500080 CV and Civil No. 980500124, the interlocutory 
order of January 22, 1999 denying Appellants' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
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(CLARIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION) filed in Civil No. 980500124, and that portion 
of the interlocutory order of November 25, 1998 granting Appellees' MOTION TO DISMISS 
filed in Civil No. 980500124. 
This appeal is taken from the entire order of March 10, 2000, the entire order of January 
22, 1999 and of that portion of the November 25, 1998 order dismissing counts 2 - 5 of the 
Complaint in case no. 980500124 all issued in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, 
State of Utah. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2000. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
i/Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 22nd day of March, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ls\lbl\miller\pldg\pldg.98\Notice of Appeal 
By: C^T\ SAOAMJJJJU, 
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